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DISCOVERING SECRETS: ACT OF STATE
DEFENSES TO BRIBERY CASES
Elizabeth Spahn*

Prosecutionof white collar crime, particularlygrand corruption bribery, is
increasing.High-level bribery is structurallysimilar to illegal drug cartels and
terrorist organizations.Bribe-givers are serviced by multinational networks of
attorneys and bankers-the "gatekeepers."
The prosecution of New York attorney and banker, James H. Giffen, in the
Southern District of New York generated a pair of landmark opinions on
significant issues of first impression rejecting act of state doctrine defenses to
bribery cases. Act of state doctrine defenses involve complex legal issues at
obscure intersections of U.S. criminal law, constitutional law, conflicts of law,
and internationalcomity.
The first opinion in the Giffen case provides helpful precedent on a central
legal hurdle facing prosecutors developing cases-discovering the facts of
bribery schemes where documents are ostensibly protected by foreign law. The
second opinion arose in an importantfactual context, where the alleged U.S.
bribe-giver also held official titles inside a foreign government.
That the US. Department of Justice was apparently not undermined in the
Giffen case despite the best efforts ofpowerful U.S. lobbyists and lawfirms in a
case allegedly involving $105 million in bribes from major oil companies
should not be worthy of a law review article under normal circumstances. The
prosecution of the Giffen case, at the time the largest in the history of the
Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct, during one of the darkest periods in the history
of the U.S. Department of Justice, demonstrates the rule of law operating even
handedly, even when major oil interests are at stake.

* Professor of Law, New England Law I Boston. E-mail: espahn@nesl.edu. My thanks to
Dean John O'Brien for the summer stipend that made this Article possible. My thanks also for
research assistance by Rochelle Meddoff, Brian Cowan, Antonio Trebbiano, and always Barry
Steams. My thanks also for editing by Erica Spahn Mena-Landry and Willis Riccio. Errors are mine
alone.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Law enforcement officials in the United States are increasingly
prosecuting Americans who bribe foreign officials.' Bribing officials
1. See Donald Zarin, Introduction to THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 2009: COPING
WITH HEIGHTENED ENFORCEMENT RISKs, 102-03 (PLI Corporate Law & Practice, Course
Handbook Series No. B-1737, 2009) [hereinafter FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 2009];
Attorney Sees More Individuals Named in Ramped Up FCPA Enforcement Effort, 41 Sec. Reg. & L.
(BNA) No. 32, at 1495 (Aug. 10, 2009). An range of other Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development ("OECD") member nations' prosecutors are also focusing on their own domestic
businesses' corrupt activities abroad including, for example, the German crackdown on Siemens
and the French crackdown on its national oil company, Elf-Aquitaine. See FRITZ HElMANN &
GILLIAN DELL, TRANSPARENCY INT'L, PROGRESS REPORT 2008: ENFORCEMENT OF THE OECD
CONVENTION ON COMBATING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL
at
available
45-46
(2008),
10-11,
21-22,
TRANSACTIONS
BUSINESS
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inside the United States has never been accorded much tolerance.2
Where bribes were paid to foreign officials, however, some prosecutors
in the past chose to look the other way, allocating scarce prosecutorial
resources to "more significant" criminal activity.3
The notion that bribery abroad is a "victimless" crime has been
fundamentally challenged by evidence from a wide array of respected
economists.4 The consensus is that widespread corruption, especially
grand corruption (big bribes paid to high-level foreign officials) greatly
exacerbates-some would even say causes-grinding global poverty.5
Global aid agencies agree, from U.S. AID, 6 World Bank, and the

http://www.transparency.org/news-room/in-focus/2008/oecdreport; see also OECD Convention
on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, Dec. 17,
1997, 37 I.L.M. 1, available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/4/18/38028044.pdf [hereinafter
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention] (establishing legally binding standards to criminalize acts of
bribery by a foreign public official). The British, despite public relations statements, continue to lag
in actual enforcement actions where their own self-interest might be damaged. See, e.g., HEIMANN
& DELL, supra, at 40-42 (describing the action of the House of Lords in the BAE bribery scandal).
2. Bribing government officials inside the United States results in major prosecutions, such
as those of Jack Abramoff and former Illinois Governer Rod Blagojevich. Susan Schmidt & James
V. Grimaldi, The Fast Rise and Steep Fall of Jack Abramoff How a Well-Connected Lobbyist
Became the Center ofa Far-ReachingCorruptionScandal, WASH. POST, Dec. 29, 2005, at Al; The
Caucus: The New York Times Politics Blog, http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/04/02/exillinois-govemor-is-indicted-on-corruption-charges/ (Apr. 2, 2006, 18:28 EST).
3. A double standard of prosecuting bribery at home, but tolerating bribery of (nonCaucasian) foreigners is the subject of a very significant legal history article disclosing the racial
bias inherent in such a double standard. Padideh Ala'i, The Legacy of GeographicalMorality and
Colonialism: A Historical Assessment of the Current Crusade Against Corruption, 33 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 877, 889-93, 930 (2000); see also Elizabeth Spahn, International Bribery: The
Moral Imperialism Critiques, 18 MINN. J. INT'L L. 155, 190-92 (2009) (commending Ala'i's
contribution to the modern corruption debates).
4.

ERIC CHETWYND

ET AL.,

CORRUPTION AND

POVERTY:

A REVIEW

OF RECENT

LITERATURE 7-11 (2003), available at http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdfdocs/PNACW645.pdf; Elizabeth
Spahn, No Body Gets Hurt?, 42 GEO. J. INT'L LAW (forthcoming 2010) (reviewing the economics
literature). See generally INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORRUPTION (Susan
Rose-Ackerman ed., 2006) (providing a wide sample of the work of various economists analyzing
the economics of corruption with an excellent introduction by Rose-Ackerman surveying the field).
5. CHETWYND ET AL., supra note 4, at I1-12. A concise, readable introduction to the effects
of corruption on development and poverty, this technical U.S. AID pamphlet "shows an inverse
correlation between aggregate economic growth and corruption; in general, countries with higher
corruption experience less economic growth." Id. at 7.
6. USAID, Democracy and Governance: Fighting Corruption, http://www.usaid.gov/our_
work/democracyandgovemance/technicalareas/anti-corruption (last visited Apr. 14, 2010).
7. World Bank, Anticorruption, http://web.worldbank.org (follow "Topics" hyperlink; then
follow "Anticorruption" hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 14, 2010).
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International Monetary Fund8 to non-governmental agencies such as
international Catholic Relief Services9 and Transparency International. 0
Free market fiscal conservatives are also joining the chorus of
concern because of the negative impact of irrational bribe-motivated
decisions on market discipline." Contracts are granted not based any
"rational" market factors such as price, service, or quality, but rather
based upon who pays the biggest bribe. Responsible corporations doing
business by the rules are crippled when competing with bribe-givers.
The amount of business lost by law-abiding corporations is staggering.12
Consumer and environmental advocates are also examining the
impact of bribery abroad on Americans. Regulatory enforcement of
safety and environmental standards are undermined by bribe-giving
corporations abroad leading to deaths of consumers inside the United
States1 3 as well as abroad. 14 In a globally integrated economy, activity
"abroad" directly affects ordinary consumers at home.
8. Int'l Monetary Fund, The IMF and Good Governance, http://www.imf.org/external/np/
exr/facts/gov.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2010).
9. Catholic Relief Servs., Human Trafficking: An Overview, http://crs.org/publicpolicy/in depth.cfm (last visited Apr. 14, 2010).
10. See generally TRANSPARENCY INT'L, GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 2009: CORRUPTION
AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR (2009) (discussing the role the private sector plays in fighting corruption
worldwide and identifying areas of reform).
I1. See the considerable body of scholarship from University of Pennsylvania Wharton
Business School Professor Philip Nichols. Philip M. Nichols et al., Corruption as a Pan-Cultural
Phenomenon: An Empirical Study in Countries at Opposite Ends of the Former Soviet Empire, 39
TEX. INT'L L.J. 215, 217 & n.10 (2004) ("Bribery distorts economic decisions because rather than
purchasing a good or service based on price, quality, and fit of that good or service, a purchase is
based on the size and quality of a bribe."); Philip M. Nichols, The Fit Between Changes to the
International Corruption Regime and Indigenous Perceptions of Corruption in Kazakhstan, 22
U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 863, 872 (2001) ("[P]ublic corruption distorts economic decisions (which,
in statist countries, can distort the entire economy)."); see also YASHENG HUANG, SELLING CHINA:
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT DURING THE REFORM ERA 112 (2005) (describing the negative
effects of bribery on the Chinese economy).
12. The U.S. Department of Commerce estimates that U.S. corporations lost between $45
billion and $80 billion in contracts by competing with European bribe-giving corporations prior to
ratification of the OECD convention. See Duane Windsor & Kathleen A. Getz, Multilateral
Cooperation to Combat Corruption: Normative Regimes Despite Mixed Motives and Diverse
Values, 33 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 731, 761-62 (2000). Although speculative, the World Bank estimates
the annual cost of corruption to be more than $80 billion, while the International Monetary Fund
estimates that a country's growth rate can reduce by 0.5% a year due to corruption. See Nancy
Zucker Boswell & Peter Richardson, Anti-Corruption: Unshackling Economic Development, ECON.
PERSP., Mar. 2003, at 16, 16, http://italy.usembassy.gov/pdf/ej/ijee03O3.pdf The vast amount of
money lost to corruption "is virtually impossible to calculate since payments of bribes are not
publicly recorded." Transparency Int'l, Frequently Asked Questions About Corruption,
http://www.transparency.org/news room/faq/corruption faq#faqcorr4 (last visited Apr. 14, 2010).
13. See Mark Levin, Lighting Up the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A Case Study of U.S.
Tobacco Industry Political Influence Buying in Japan, 34 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 471, 506
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Although many U.S. prosecutors recognize the devastating harm
caused by grand corruption bribery, they face difficult decisions about
allocating scarce resources to hunting down this particular variety of
white collar criminals. These targets are not easy pickings. Highly
organized, sophisticated bribery schemes (with suitable money
laundering devices to hide the criminal activity) are more akin to
international illegal drug cartels or terrorist organizations than local
street crime. Bribe-givers are serviced by highly paid organized
networks of attorneys, accountants, and bankers-"[g]atekeepers" 5 developing intricate loophole devices to discourage or derail underfunded and under-staffed government prosecutors. This is true big game
hunting.
Despite the almost biblical David and Goliath proportions of the
problems, the U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ") and many state and
(2009); Black Money: Introduction, FRONTLINE, Apr. 7, 2009, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/
pages/frontline/blackmoney/etc/synopsis.html. Toothpaste manufactured in China and imported to
the United States was found to have diethylene glycol, a toxic chemical that has a severe impact on
children and people with liver or kidney disease. Colgate Warns of Fake Toothpaste in US.,
The
REUTERS, June 14, 2007, http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/N14427041.htm.
toothpaste was sold at discount stores in the United States and was pulled from shelves by the Food
and Drug Administration. Id. For a small sample of a few more of the many incidents, see Walt
Bogdanich, China ProhibitsPoisonous IndustrialSolvent in Toothpaste, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2007,
at C4; Walt Bogdanich, Chinese Chemicals Flow Unchecked to Market, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2007,
at Al; Jane Spencer & Nicholas Casey, Toy Recall Shows Challenge China Poses to Partner,WALL
ST. J., Aug. 3, 2007, at Al; and Jim Yardley, Chinese Baby Formula Scandal Widens as 2nd Death
Is Announced, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2008, at A6; JapanScare Over China Dumplings, BBC NEWS,
Jan. 31, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hilasia-pacific/7219365.stm. For examples of regulatory
efforts to increase product safety, see Consumer Product Safety Modernization Act of 2007, H.R.
4040, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007), and Legislation to Improve Consumer Product Safety for
Children: Hearing on H.R. 2474, H.R. 1699, H.R. 814, and H.R. 1721 Before the Subcomm. on
Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 110th
Cong. 67-68 (2007) (testimony of Hon. Nancy A. Nord, Chairman, U.S. Consumer Product Safety
Commission), expressing the "understandable concern over the growing number of product recalls
of imported products, including those from China."
14. Walt Bogdanich & Jake Hooker, From China to Panama,a Trail of Poisoned Medicine,
N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2007, at Al. At least one hundred Panamanians died from ingesting diethylene
glycol that was substituted for the more expensive glycerin in cough syrup. Id.
15. Rebecca Gregory, The Lawyer's Role: Will Uncle Sam Want You in the Fight Against
Money Laundering and Terrorism?,72 UMKC L. REV. 23, 32-33 (2003). One of these suggestions
requires lawyers to report suspicious financial transactions, making them a responsible
"gatekeeper." FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, 40 RECOMMENDATIONS 5-6 (2003). There is controversy
about the implementation of a gatekeeper initiative in the Eurpeon Union, but the practice was
mandated in 2001. Edward J. Krauland & Aaron R. Hutman, Money Laundering Enforcement and
Policy, 38 INT'L LAW. 509, 516 (2004). The reaction is different in the United States, where the
American Bar Association is the main lobbyist behind Congress's rejection of mandated gatekeeper
initiatives. Am. Bar Ass'n, Task Force on Gatekeeper Regulation and the Profession: Task Force
Actions and Related Documents, http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/taskforce/actions.html (last visited
Apr. 14, 2010).
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local prosecutors are gearing up to address the problem of Americans
bribing abroad.16 U.S. law enforcement officials and judges are not well
trained under the current U.S. legal education system for these modern
legal issues that integrate "domestic," "international," and "foreign"
law.' 7 Raising the spectre of complex foreign sovereignty doctrines has
sometimes been sufficient to deflect U.S. law enforcers and judges.
One landmark case, the prosecution of New York attorney and
merchant banker, James Giffen, in the Southern District of New York,18
should provide some welcome legal analysis and precedent to redress
this omission in our legal education and to ease the analytical burdens
facing prosecutors and judges enforcing U.S. laws. This Article will
examine one complex legal issue, the act of state doctrine, used to shield
an alleged American bribe-giver facing prosecution in the Southern
District of New York.
The act of state doctrine is not typical fare for most prosecutors or
judges in U.S. criminal proceedings. The first opinion addressing the act
of state doctrine in a U.S. bribery case was issued in 2002 in the Giffen 9
prosecution by Judge Denny Chin (more recently famous for sentencing
white collar criminal, Ponzi scheme architect Bernie Madoff). The 2002
Chin opinion is a landmark case of first impression.20 It provides helpful
precedent for future decisions on the most significant legal hurdle facing
prosecutors developing a case-discovering the facts of complicated
bribery schemes where the documents are ostensibly protected by
foreign law.2
The second opinion discussing the act of state doctrine in a bribery
case was written by Judge William H. Pauley in 2004, also in the Gifen

16. Timothy L. Dickinson et al., The Past Year in Review: Another Banner Year for
Enforcement, in FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 2009, supra note 1, at 185, 191, 193-97, 205.
The Manhattan District Attorney's Office is also very active in prosecuting bribery and international
money laundering cases, such as the July 28, 2009 indictment of check-cashing stores for avoiding
money laundering regulations and the April 7, 2009 indictment of a Chinese citizen who used
Manhattan banks to facilitate money laundering and "the proliferation of illicit missile and nuclear
technology to the Government of Iran." New York County District Attorney's Office, What's New,
http://manhattanda.org/whatsnew/ (last visited Apr. 14, 2010).
17. See Paul R. Dubinsky, Is TransnationalLitigation a Distinct Field? The Persistence of
Exceptionalism in American ProceduralLaw, 44 STAN. J. INT'L L. 301, 317, 319 (2008); Linda
Silberman, Transnational Litigation: Is There a "Field"? A Tribute to Hal Maier, 39 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1427, 1429 (2006).
18. United States v. Giffen (Gifen l), 326 F. Supp. 2d 497, 499 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
19. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated August 9, 2000 (In re GrandJury Subpoena 1), 218 F.
Supp. 2d 544, 547, 551 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
20. Id. at 547.
21. Id.
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prosecution.2 Judge Pauley's opinion is also a landmark case of first
impression. 2 3 The Pauley opinion arose in a significant factual context,
where the alleged U.S. bribe-giver also holds official titles inside a
foreign government.24
Together, these two landmark opinions in the Giffen case regarding
the application of the act of state doctrine to bribery cases should
provide helpful guidance to future courts, prosecutors, and defense
attorneys. Carefully examining these opinions will also provide suitable
materials for training law students in these complex problems which will
increasingly face the next generation of U.S. lawyers.
II. THE SAGA OF UNITED STATES V. JAMES H. GIFFEN

The Giffen case itself, which is still on-going, provides a gripping
story of alleged grand corruption bribery suitable for a Hollywood
movie. The epic saga involves a New York lawyer and merchant banker,
U.S. citizen James H. Giffen. 25 Giffen served as the gatekeeper and
consultant for the President of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbaev. 2 6
Immensely lucrative oil and gas contracts are at stake in the litigation.2 7
U.S. intelligence services may or may not be involved. 2 8 The alleged
allegedly
bribe money-about $105 million U.S. dollarS2 9-was
22. Gifen 1, 326 F. Supp. 2d at 501-03.
23. Id. at 505.
24. Id. at 499-500.
25. Rod Stodghill, Oil, Cash and Corruption: How Influence Flowed Through Political
Pipelines, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2006, § 3 (Sunday Business), at 1.
26.

See STEVE LEVINE, THE OIL AND THE GLORY: THE PURSUIT OF EMPIRE AND FORTUNE ON

THE CASPIAN SEA 375-76 (2007). Chapters eight, fifteen, and sixteen provide a fascinating
introduction to the history of Kazakh oil and gas developments. Id. LeVine, a reporter for the Wall
Street Journal, discusses James Giffen's role in Kazakhstan. Id at 373-78.
27. Kazakhstan's proven and probable oil and gas reserves are estimated at about 30 billion
barrels, according to the International Monetary Fund ("IMF"). See Republic of Kazakhstan:
Selected Issues, at 23 tbl.3, IMF Country Report No. 0/362, (July 6, 2004), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2004/cr04362.pdf;
see also Energy Info. Admin.,
Kazakhstan: Major Oil and Natural Gas Projects, http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/kazaproj.html
(last visited Apr. 14, 2010) (listing various oil and gas fields and corporate interests in particular
Kazakh reserves).
28. United States v. Giffen (Gifen Ill), 473 F.3d 30, 32, 34 (2d Cir. 2006). In March, 2004,
defendant James Giffen for the first time raised an affirmative defense based on the public authority
doctrine. Id. at 32. The district court permitted discovery of classified material based on Giffen's
proffer under the public authority defense. United States v. Giffen (Gifen II), 379 F. Supp. 2d 337,
342 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). The Second Circuit Court of Appeals denied the government's interlocutory
appeal, while expressing substantial doubt whether Giffen's proffer actually satisfied the elements
of either the public authority or entrapment by estoppel defenses. Giffen III, 473 F.3d at 44.
29. The opinions refer to $78 and $80 million in bribes. Giffen III, 473 F.3d at 31-32; Gifen
H1,379 F. Supp. 2d at 340. However, our math, adding up the actual amounts alleged in the
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laundered through pass-through accounts at three U.S. banks in New
York to at least thirty accounts at four different Swiss banks. 30 The
money was allegedly used for the personal benefit of President
Nazarbaev, the Oil Minister Nurlan Balgimaev, and one additional
Kazakh official (still un-named) allegedly to buy millions of dollars in
jewelry, furs, jet skis and snowmobiles, tuition, vacations, and to pay off
credit cards. 3 1
The unveiling of the factual allegations came gradually over an
eight year period,32 with various parties fighting disclosure every step of
the way. Initially the proceeding was protected by the secrecy of grand
jury deliberations. The initial opinion published in the case in 2002 by
Judge Chin, which is one main subject of this Article, does not name
either the targets of the grand jury's investigations (James H. Giffen and
Mercator Corporation) or the foreign country allegedly involved in the
bribery (the Republic of Kazakhstan). Instead, the 2002 opinion states
that "[t]his is a redacted version of an Opinion filed under seal." 34 Giffen
is identified only as "John Doe"; Mercator is the "Corporation";
Kazakhstan is the "Republic."3
One short year later, in 2003, as the defendants appealed discovery
orders, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit identified all the
various U.S. defendants by name. By 2004, in the opinion by Judge
Pauley that is the second main subject of this Article, the names of
indictments resulted in a total of at least $105 million. See Brian Cowan, Cost/Benefit Analysis of
Gatekeeper Risk in International Business Transactions 7 & n.36 (May 2009) (unpublished student
research project, on file with the Hofstra Law Review).
30. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated March 19, 2002 & August 2, 2002 (In re Grand Jury
Subpoenas II), 318 F.3d 379, 381 (2d Cir. 2002). More than thirty Swiss bank accounts were
allegedly involved. Id. at 382. Four different Swiss banks were allegedly involved. Id. at 381. Only
one Swiss bank has been publicly identified in the court opinions so far, Credit Agricole Indosuez,
at the time Banque Indosuez. Giffen III, 473 F.3d. at 35.
31. Giffen III, 473 F.3d at 32.
32. My thanks to Brian Cowan, NESL class of 2009, for his tenacious work digging out these
facts. See Cowan, supra note 29, at 6-12.
33. For example, prosecutors indicated they had filed Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty
("MLAT") requests with the Swiss government seeking bank records related to the Giffen case, but
that more than two years had elapsed and "the response received from [the government of]
Switzerland ... has been incomplete or unsatisfactory." In re GrandJury Subpoenas II, 318 F.3d at
381-82. The United States, in 1987 under President Ronald Reagan, negotiated a Memorandum of
Understanding ("MOU") with Switzerland limiting United States' attempts to subpoena information
from United States branches of Swiss banks. Id. at 382-83.
34. In re GrandJury Subpoena 1, 218 F. Supp. 2d 544, 547 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
35. Id. at 548. The Second Circuit panel which first identified the parties involved by name
included then-Judge, now United States Supreme Court Justice Sonia Sotomayer. See Gifen III, 473
F.3d at 31.
36. See In re GrandJury Subpoena II, 318 F.3d at 381.
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individual Kazakh officials allegedly involved were published: President
Nazarbaev and Nurlan Balgimaev, former Prime Minister and then-Oil
Minister of the Republic. 37 Friedhelm Eronat's involvement has not yet
been disclosed in the Gifen prosecution documents; he is identified only
as co-conspirator #1.38 Jean Jacques Bovay is most likely co-conspirator
#3 according to a related Swiss bribery probe.39
None of the seven banks allegedly involved has been publicly
indicted so far.4 0 Of the alleged sources of the money, U.S.-listed oil and
gas companies seeking lucrative contracts in Kazakhstan, only one
Mobil Oil executive, J. Bryan Williams (co-conspirator #2), has been
charged with or convicted of criminal activity. 4 1 The U.S.-listed oil and
gas companies allegedly supplying the bribe money are named in the
indictment of Giffen, but have not themselves been publicly indicted.42
The indictment names Mobil Oil, Amoco, Philips, and Texaco.43 British
Petroleum ("BP"), Statoil, and British Gas have been implicated in a
separate civil lawsuit involving Giffen's role in Kazakh oil and gas
contracts, but have largely been protected so far from embarrassing

37. Giffen 1, 326 F. Supp. 2d 497, 499 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); see also Gifen II, 379 F. Supp. 337,
340 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (referring to defendants by name in the discovery disclosure opinion decided
the same year).
38. See Indictment at 10, 12, United States v. James H. Giffen, No. 03 Crim. 404 (S.D.N.Y.
2008). Mr. Eronat, a former U.S. citizen now believed to be a citizen of the United Kingdom, has
been involved with numerous controversial oil deals including Darfur. Johnathan Miller, Briton
Involved in Sudan Oil Drill, CHANNEL 4 NEWS, June 9, 2005, http://www.channel4.com/news/
articles/world/briton%20involved%20in%20sudan%20oil%20drill/108405. As owner of two shell
companies, Nichem Energy, Ltd., and Vaeko Europe Ltd., Eronat was involved in a civil breach of
contract case involving the Giffen/Kazakhstan transactions which is how we discovered his identity.
See Eronat v. Tabbah, [2002] EWCA (Civ) 950, [2] (Eng.).
39. Steve Levine & Marcus Walker, Swiss Launch Bribery Probe in Kazakh Case, WALL ST.
J., May 6, 2003, at A22.
40. Chase Manhattan, Citibank, Bankers Trust, Credit Agricole Indosuez (at the time Banque
Indosuez), Banque Bruxelles Lambert (Suisse), Pictet & Cie, and Credit Suisse. Indictment, supra
note 38, at 3, 10, 19, 62-63, 70-71. The Indictment names three Swiss banks and one U.S. bank
seeking attachments of funds Giffen allegedly laundered as part of the alleged bribery scheme.
Paragraph 48 names the fourth Swiss bank, Credit Suisse, as having wired over $100 million in
funds allegedly involved in the scheme. Id. at 19.
41. See Indictment, supra note 38, at 11, 63-64, 67. Mr. Williams, a vice president at Mobil
Oil at the time, was sentenced to forty-six months in prison and a $25,000 fine on tax charges
related to his participation in the Giffen/Kazakhstan alleged bribery scheme. See United States v.
Williams, 92 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 2003-6785, 2003-6785, 2003-6792 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). He refused to
testify against Giffen.
42. See Indictment, supra note 38, at 9, 14, 21, 50.
43. Id. (Mobil Oil at paragraph 17, Amoco at paragraph 32, Phillips at paragraph 53, and
Texaco at paragraph 87J).
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public disclosures, although their names have been leaked on the
Internet."
The heroic efforts to maintain the secrecy of the identities of the
players even extended to James Giffen's first legal defense team at Akin
Gump Hauer & Feld LLP ("Akin Gump"), which tried to shield some of
the documents (from the thirty Swiss bank accounts at four different
Swiss banks plus Chase Manhattan, Citibank, and Bankers Trust) under
the attorney-client privilege as work product based on their work
compiling the bank records. The Second Circuit rejected the attorney
work-product shield out of hand, expressing some chagrin about the
"carefully orchestrated defense strategy."A "Similarly troubling is the
[law] firm's failure to identify or submit the responsive documents for in
camera review, a practice both long standing and routine in cases
involving claims of privilege."
By 2004, Giffen had changed law firms. Now represented by
Kronish Lieb Weiner & Hellman of New York, Giffen raised secrecy
again, this time on the offense.47 Seeking classified U.S. intelligence
agencies' documents to explore whether a public authority defense
might be available to him, Giffen filed broad discovery requests.4 8 (This
44. The FCPA Blog, Grynberg v. BP et al., http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2008/4/15/
grynberg-v-bp-et-al.html (Apr. 14, 2008, 21:46 EST). The names of the other oil companies were
leaked through a civil suit filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia by Colorado
oilman Jack Grynberg. See id In the complaint Grynberg alleges that BP, Statoil, and British Gas
used Grynberg's money to bribe Kazakh officials through James Giffen. Id. A prominent scientific
analyst in the U.S. Army Research and Development Command, Grynberg has forty years
experience in international petroleum exploration, spending $20 million to file several False Claims
Act qui tam lawsuits against 305 corporations who were allegedly mismeasuring the volume of
natural gas in an attempt to defraud Native Americans of natural gas royalties. Id.; see, e.g., In re
Natural Gas Royalties Qui Tam Litigation, 467 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1127 (D. Wyo. 2006); United
States ex rel. Grynberg v. Alaska Pipeline Co., No. Civ. 95-725(TFH), 1997 WL 33763820, at *1
(D.D.C. Mar. 27, 1997). The qui tam actions are currently pending before the U.S. Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals. The FCPA Blog, supra.
45. In re GrandJury Subpoena II, 318 F.3d 379, 386 (2d Cir. 2002).
46. Id.
47. Gifen II, 379 F. Supp. 2d 337, 340-41 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
48. Id at 340-41. Giffen's proffer in 2004 alleges that he was encouraged by an unnamed
U.S. intelligence agency "to stay close to" the President of Kazakhstan and to "continue to report."
Giffen III, 473 F.3d 30, 35 (2d Cir. 2006). The Second Circuit observed, at some length, that
Giffen's proffer does not appear to meet the legal standards for either a public authority defense or
an entrapment by estoppel defense. Id. at 39-43. There are three versions of the public authority
defense: (1) the defendant may offer evidence that he or she mistakenly believed that the crimes
were performed in cooperation with the government; (2) the defendant knowingly committed a
criminal act in reliance on a grant of authority from a government official; and (3) "entrapment by
estoppel," in which the government agent makes a mistake that the defendant relied on when
breaking the law. These defenses are examined in United States v. Abcasis, 45 F.3d 39, 43-44 (2d
Cir. 1995) and United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 83-84 (2d Cir. 1984). For a concise
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is known informally as the "Ollie North defense" strategy.) 49 Giffen
apparently believes that virtually the entire gamut of U.S. intelligence
agencies authorized his alleged bribery of Nazarbaev as well as the
alleged money laundering and tax evasion schemes. 50 Giffen claims that

explanation of the public authority defenses and applicable law, see generally U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL § 2055 (1997), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/
eousa/foia readingroom/usam/title9/crmOO00.htm (click links at top of page for specific
sections).
49. Using a public authority defense to compel wide-ranging discovery of classified U.S.
intelligence documents in the hopes that the government will dismiss the case rather than face
public embarrassment is a fairly standard defense ploy. See Giffen III, 473 F.3d at 33. ("If the court
declines to permit such a substitution, and the government objects to disclosure of the classified
information, the presumptive remedy is dismissal of the indictment."). It is known informally as the
"Ollie North defense." See Kathleen A. Ravotti, Note, Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United
States and United States v. Monsanto: The "War on Drugs" Gets a New Recruit, 22 LOY. U. CHI.
L.J. 297, 333 n.254 (1990). Sometimes it is referred to as the "Nuremberg" defense, referring to
Nazi officials who defended war crimes charges on the grounds that they were just following orders.
See John M. Burman, The Ethical Duties of Prosecutorsof Detainees Who Appear Before Military
Commissions, 18 TEMP. POL. & CIv. RTS. L. REV. 69, 87, 109 (2008); Ross L. Weiner, Note, The
Office ofLegal Counsel and Torture: The Law as Both a Sword andShield, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
524, 532 (2009).
North's new twist was to use embarrassing discovery requests attempting to derail the
prosecution. During the Iran-Contra scandal under the Reagan administration, secret arms-forhostages deals with the hostile government in Iran surfaced. Abraham D. Sofaer, Iran-Contra:
EthicalConduct and Public Policy, 40 HoUs. L. REV. 1081, 1084 (2003). Sofaer was Legal Advisor
to the U.S. Department of State during this period. Lt. Colonel Oliver L. North defended delivery of
U.S. missiles to the hostile Iranian government in violation of U.S. statutes claiming public
authorization from President Ronald Reagan. See id. at 1081, 1085-86. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the lower court's refusal to subpoena President Reagan regarding North's public
authorization defense. United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 888-89 (D.C. Cir. 1990). The appellate
court also affirmed the trial court's jury instructions severely limiting the public authorization
defense and the trial court's limitations on discovery of classified materials. Id. at 881, 898. North's
convictions on three felony counts were overturned on other grounds. Id. at 852. (Despite President
Reagan's repeated public denials of secret arms-for-hostage deals with Iran at the time, it turned out
that Reagan had actually authorized several arms-for-hostages deals. North had been authorized as it
eventually turned out; President Reagan left him twisting in the wind. See Sofaer, supra, at 108486).
The Ollie North defense strategy is to hope that the embarrassment to the U.S. intelligence
agencies will be sufficient to make the case go away, since the presumptive remedy for U.S.
government's objections to disclosure of classified materials is dismissal of the criminal case. See
North, 910 F.2d at 899. Perhaps it is payback-the U.S. government is embarrassing the President
of Kazakhstan with disclosures of his secrets, so Giffen gets even by forcing disclosure of U.S.
intelligence agency activities concerning Kazakhstan. Perhaps Giffen was actually a U.S.
intelligence officer, although the U.S. intelligence communities deny this. North was an active duty
member of the U.S. armed forces at the time he delivered U.S. missiles to Iran, and as it turns out,
actually authorized to do so by President Reagan. Sofaer, supra, at 1085-86. Giffen was, and is, a
private citizen.
50. Giffen II, 379 F. Supp. 2d at 341 ("Giffen contends that his activities with senior Kazakh
officials were at the behest of the Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA"), the National Security
Council ("NSC"), the Department of State, and the White House.").
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an un-named U.S. intelligence agent's alleged statement "to remain
close to" President Nazarbaev and "continue reporting" constituted
actual or apparent government authorization or entrapment to engage in
the alleged bribery, money laundering, and tax evasion activities."
District Court Judge Pauley agreed to allow Giffen discovery
access to U.S. government classified documents regarding U.S.
intelligence activities in Kazakhstan during the period in question.52 The
Second Circuit dismissed the government's interlocutory appeal of
Giffen's discovery motions, but remanded to the district court with very
detailed dicta about the applicable legal standards regarding the public
authority defenses, indicating that Giffen's proffer did not appear to
meet applicable legal standards for either public authority or entrapment
by estoppel defenses.53 "Remain close" and "continue reporting" are
apparently not sufficient to constitute either authorization or entrapment
by U.S. intelligence services; although as of 2010, Giffen continues
successfully to seek discovery based on this defense in the district
court.54 Most recently an undated letter surfaced from Senator Mark
Pryor (D-Ark.) to then-U.S. Attorney General Michael Mukasey,
opposing a request for prosecutorial immunity from a prospective
witness in the Giffen case on the grounds of the witness's alleged human
rights abuses.5 5 The case is still pending, awaiting trial as of the spring of
2010.
The Giffen case was developed under then-U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC") Enforcement Director, Stan Sporkin.
The case was apparently referred to the United States by Swiss banking
authorities investigating an inquiry from Belgian officials.5 6 Assistant
U.S. Attorneys Peter G. Neiman and Philip E. Urofsky represented the

51. Giffen III, 473 F.3d at 35.
52. Giffen II, 379 F. Supp. 2d at 343.
53. Gifen III, 473 F.3d at 39-43; id. at 44 ("[W]e doubt that Giffen has alleged facts
satisfying the elements of actual public authority or entrapment by estoppel .... [T]he district court
may find it useful to consider these observations when it returns ... to the question whether Giffen
can mount a public authority defense.").
54. See United States v. Giffen, No. 03 Cr. 404, at 3 (S.D.N.Y. June 5, 2009), availableat
http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2009/7/16/james-giffen-and-americas-secrets.html (follow hyperlink
labeled "here" in the sixth paragraph).
55. Letter from Senator Mark Pryor to Michael Mukasey, Attorney Gen., (n.d.), availableat
http://mainjustice.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/01/pryor-letter-to-doj.pdf. The prospective witness,
Mr. Rakhat Aliyev, was a high-ranking official in the Kazakh successor to the KGB and headed
Kazakhstan's Tax Police according to Senator Pryor's letter. Id. Senator Pryor raised human rights
objections to a grant of immunity because of Mr. Aliyev's alleged past human rights abuses based
on an undated article in the Washington Times referred to in Senator Pryor's letter. Id.
56. LEVINE, supra note 26, at 373-75.
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people in both the 2002 and 2004 act of state aspects of the litigation,
which are the main subjects of this Article.17
This Article will not attempt to address all the myriad issues
presented in the Giffen case. Instead it focuses on the specific legal
issues arising where act of state defenses to bribery prosecutions are
raised.
III. SECRECY
Secrecy is the key issue for both bribe-givers and bribe-takers. This
is not merely because giving bribes violates the domestic criminal laws
of the United States58 and all other OECD member nations.59 Every
nation, including all the developing and transition economy countries,
has domestic laws which prohibit their own government officials from
taking bribes from foreigners.60
Secrecy is crucial for those operating in a developed legal system to
avoid criminal prosecutions as well as the dreaded tax and securities law
enforcers. For those operating in a system where law is less of a threat
and those operating in "weak legal regime" systems in which the will of
the executive is the law, secrecy is equally important in maintaining a
fagade of legitimacy and access to foreign aid.6 Secrecy allows business
57. Philip Urofsky is, as of 2010, a partner at Shearman & Sterling, LLP. See Sherman &
Sterling LLP, Philip Urofsky, http://www.shearman.com/purofsky/ (last visited Apr. 14, 2010).
Peter G. Neiman is still listed on PACER as lead counsel for the United States, but now serves as
counsel in the Litigation/Controversy Department of WilmerHale. See United States v. Giffen,
Criminal Docket, No. 03-cr-00404-WHP-1 (Criminal Docket) (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2003);
WilmerHale, Peter G. Neiman, http://www.wilmerhale.com/peter-neiman/ (last visited Apr. 14,
2010). Urofsky and Neiman have been replaced by prosecutors Lee Renzin and Stephen J. Ritchin.
CriminalDocket, supra.
58. See, e.g., Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2006) (prohibiting
the bribery of foreign officials).
59. OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, supra note 1, at 6.
60. Philip M. Nichols, Outlawing Transnational Bribery Through the World Trade
Organization, 28 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 305, 306 (1997). Professor Nichols, of the Wharton
Business School at the University of Pennsylvania, is the leading business ethics scholar on
international bribery. For an example of his work in this area, see generally Nichols, supra note I1,
analyzing attitudes and perceptions of corruption in Kazakhstan. Mark Levin's important article
analyzing the history of U.S. tobacco industry bribery in Japan stresses the central importance of
secrecy. See Levin, supranote 13, at 479-81.
Controversy does exist about whether a customary gift can constitute a bribe, and whether
criminalizing such gifts is a form of moral imperialism. See Spahn, supra note 3, at 163. Under the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, all a foreign sovereign needs to do to insulate "customary" gifts is to
legalize them. Id. at 165.
61. See Esther Pan, ForeignAid: Millennium ChallengeAccount, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL.,
May 28, 2004, http://www.cfr.org/publication/7748/. President George W. Bush initiated a new
program of development aid that "takes into account a country's credit rating, annual rate of
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as usual, looting the country for personal gain and/or funding private
paramilitary security forces 62 while maintaining the public mask of a
"legitimate" sovereign doing business with "legitimate" multinational
businesses.63
The crucial issue for U.S. law enforcement contemplating criminal
charges against the supply side, U.S. bribe-givers, is discovery of
documents and collection of evidence abroad. While the targets of
prosecution are U.S.-listed corporations, citizens, or resident aliens,64 the
documentary evidence trail often leads abroad. Although MLATs, 65
66
th
a671k
letters rogatory, and the Hague Convention are available to both
inflation, three-year budget deficit, trade barriers, and the number of days needed to start a
business," indicators that, if made public, give a measure of government corruption. Id. The sixteen
nations that made the information available to the public to qualify for the program are Armenia,
Benin, Bolivia, Cape Verde, Georgia, Ghana, Honduras, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mali, Mongolia,
Mozambique, Nicaragua, Senegal, Sri Lanka, and Vanuatu. Id.
The World Bank also requires openness for 167 of its development programs. The World
Bank, Projects and Operations, http://worldbank.org (follow "Projects & Operations" hyperlink)
(last visited Apr. 14, 2010).
62. The movie analogy is Nicholas Cage in the gripping Lord of War. See LORD OF WAR
(Lions Gate Films 2005). For real legal scholarship, see generally Craig S. Jordan, Note, Who Will
Guard the Guards? The Accountability ofPrivate Military Contractorsin Areas ofArmed Conflict,
35 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 309 (2009), discussing the need to address the
accountability of private military contractors. Global Witness, a non-profit human rights watchdog
organization, found "direct links between Liberia's timber industry and the network of illegal arms
transfers, private militias and human rights abuses that threaten international peace and security in
western Africa." Douglas Farah, Liberian Leader Again Finds Means to Hang On: Taylor Exploits
Timber to Keep Power, WASH. POST, June 4, 2002, at Al.
63. The "resource curse" is a notorious problem where multinational businesses contract to
extract a country's natural resources, but the large amount of money paid by the multinational
corporations rarely reaches the local people or improves living conditions. Art Durnev & Sergei
Guriev, Resource Abundance and Corporate Transparency, VOX, Nov. 21, 2007,
http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/737. Studies show that resource abundance is correlated
with declining corporate transparency, capital allocation, and growth. Id.; see also Republic of
Kazakhstan: Selected Issues, supra note 27, at 7-13 (discussing the IMF report on the natural
resources curse and Kazakhstan).
64. The jurisdiction of the FCPA is limited to U.S. "persons" and listed corporations. Lucinda
Low et al., Enforcement of the FCPA in the United States: Trends and the Effects of International
Standards, in THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT: COPING WITH HEIGHTENED ENFORCEMENT

RISKS 2007, at 63, 73-74 (PLI Corporate Law & Practice, Course Handbook Series No. B-1588,
2007); Donald Zarin, The Foreign Payments Provision, in FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
2009, supra note 1, at 109, 124.
65.

See ELLEN S. PODGOR & ROGER S. CLARK, UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL

LAW 121 (2d ed. 2008). Guides to MLATs are available from the DOJ website. U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, supra note 48, § 276. Kazakhstan does not currently have a mutual legal assistance
agreement with the United States. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TREATIES INFORCE 150-51 (2009).
66. See PODGOR & CLARK, supra note 65, at 119-21. Both the U.S. Attorney's Office and the
State Department have manuals on the use of letters rogatory. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note
48, §275; U.S. Dep't of State, Service of Legal Documents Abroad, http://travel.state.gov/law/
info/judicial/judicial_680.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2010). For a guide on the use of multiple
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federal and state prosecutors (and in some cases private civil lawsuit
plaintiffs), more efficient international mechanisms for cross-border
cooperation between law enforcement officials are still sorely needed,
particularly where more than two jurisdictions are involved in the
complex financial maneuvering.6 8
Foreign officials are often touchingly loyal to, and protective of,
their American business partner/alleged bribe-supplier; the foreign
sovereign may also wish to prevent embarrassing public disclosure of
the gifts or bribes allegedly received by his or her own officials,
relatives, and cronies. Legal defenses based on notions of foreign
sovereignty to cross-border evidence gathering efforts have been a major
hurdle for U.S. criminal law enforcement. Because bribery under the
U.S. statute by definition involves a foreign official, foreign sovereignty
defenses have been raised to shield the American alleged bribe-giver as
well as the foreign official alleged bribe-taker.
IV. SOVEREIGNTY
From the very beginning of the Giffen case, foreign sovereignty
defenses were asserted to protect the business transactions from
discovery in the U.S. grand jury proceedings. The Republic of
Kazakhstan, through their attorneys at Steptoe & Johnson, entered an
appearance in the proceedings three different timeS69 to assert shields
based on foreign sovereignty notions to protect James Giffen, his bank
Mercator, Mobil and the other oil companies, the four Swiss and three
U.S. banks, and most importantly to protect the secrets of President
Nazarbaev and Oil Minister Balgimaev.

methods of evidence collection for FCPA investigations, see PODGOR & CLARK, supra note 65, at
119-24, describing the process for obtaining letters rogatory and MLATs, and Rochelle Meddoff,
Bring Out the Big Guns: Using International Law for FCPA Prosecutions Broadens the Availability
of Foreign Discovery Mechanisms 12-22 (Dec. 2008) (unpublished student research project, on file
with Hofstra Law Review).
67. See I BRUNO A. RISTAU, INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE: CIVIL AND
COMMERCIAL 233 (2000); Meddoff, supra note 66, at 22, 25-26; see also United Nations
Convention Against Corruption, G.A. Res 58/4, U.N. Doc. A/RES/58/4 (Oct. 31, 2003).
68. See Michael D. Mann & William P. Barry, Attachment: Developments in Cross Border
Cooperationin SecuritiesEnforcement, in PARALLEL PROCEEDINGS IN SECURITIES CASES 359, 387,
399 (PLI Corporate Law & Practice, Course Handbook Series No. B-1644, 2008).

69. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena 1, 218 F. Supp. 2d 544, 549 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). The
Republic of Kazakhstan also lobbied to squelch the proceedings discussed below.
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A. The Foreign Sovereign Immunity Acto
One might fairly ask why foreign sovereignty-based defenses are
even relevant to the U.S. prosecution of U.S. persons for alleged
violations of U.S. law. The Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act ("FSIA")
does not apply to Foreign Corrupt Practices Act ("FCPA") cases. The
FSIA is limited to cases where a foreign official is named as a defendant
in U.S. judicial proceedings. 7 ' By contrast, the FCPA does not cover
foreign officials. 7 2 "Foreign officials who [allegedly] receive bribes are
not covered by the FCPA, nor can they be prosecuted for conspiracy to
violate it" under U.S. domestic law.73
There is an explicit statutory provision which provides that the
foreign sovereign and its officials are not subject to the American FCPA
statute.74 The foreign sovereign cannot be a party or a target, nor is it
directly involved in the actual proceeding.7 5 Therefore, the FSIA does
not apply at all to FCPA cases since the FSIA is limited to cases where a
76
foreign official is a defendant in a U.S. action.
Yet the interests of the foreign sovereign are very much in play,
even though the foreign sovereign him or herself can never personally
become a defendant or target in an FCPA criminal investigation in the
United States. Loyalty to the U.S. business partner and alleged bribesupplier is one potential interest of the foreign sovereign. Of course the
real interest of the foreign sovereign is to avoid public disclosure of his
70. The FSIA covers cases where a claim is made against a foreign sovereign. See 28 U.S.C.
1602-1603 (2006). The FSIA is codified in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611.
[P]rior to the enactment of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, foreign states
enjoyed absolute immunity from suit in U.S. courts. Thus, Americans with claims
against foreign nations had no recourse other than presidential espousal and settlement of
their claims .... To the extent that Congress has constitutional power to abrogate
foreign sovereign immunity and has exercised such power, the federal government can
countermand existing state and federal law claims only by adopting a contrary federal
statute or treaty.
Bradford R. Clark, Domesticating Sole Executive Agreements, 93 VA. L. REV. 1573, 1618 (2007).
Clark provides a usefil, short introduction to the enactment of the FSIA in 1976. Id. at 1618-24.
71. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1603, 1605. FSIA covers a "foreign state" and its "agenc[ies] or
instrumentalit[ies]." 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a)-(b). "An agency or instrumentality of a foreign state" must
be "a separate legal person .. . which is an organ of a foreign state" and is not a citizen of the
United States. Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006).
72. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a), 78dd-2(a), 78dd-3(a) (2006); see also Zarin, supra note 1, at
112 ("In enacting the FCPA, Congress intentionally limited its jurisdictional scope principally to
U.S. entities.").
73. In re GrandJury Subpoena 1, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 550.
74. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(a)(1)(A) (2006).
75. In re GrandJury Subpoena 1, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 550; see 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a), 78dd2(a), 78dd-3(a).
76. See 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2006).
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or her own secrets about how he or she has amassed and hidden the
allegedly ill-gotten wealth.
Raising legal defenses based on notions of foreign sovereignty are
also tactically useful. These affirmative defenses are intricate and
technical, drifting off into obscure and scary intersections of not only
foreign law, but also international comity, conflicts of law, and U.S.
constitutional law. U.S. prosecutors and judges are understandably
reluctant to take on these very well-funded alleged bribe-givers and their
accomplished battalions of high-priced attorneys. One need only
imagine a prosecutor who comes face-to-face for the first time with
foreign sovereign immunity, act of state, international comity, or
separation of powers based shields to see the tactical value for the
defense in raising such issues.
It is helpful before plunging into the intricacies of act of state
defenses to a bribery case to fix firmly in our own minds the simple
uncontroverted fact that the foreign sovereign is not, and cannot become,
a defendant in an FCPA action.
B. The Foreign CorruptPracticesAct
FCPA cases involve the United States asserting jurisdiction over
U.S. actors. The FCPA covers U.S. citizens and residents, U.S.-listed
corporations, their agents, consultants, subcontractors, subsidiaries, and
joint ventures.n The FCPA is a domestic law applied to U.S. persons.78
77. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3; see also Zarin, supra note 64, at 112-13 (describing the
FCPA's jurisdictional scope). Businesses with headquarters and operations entirely outside the
United States might not be covered under the FCPA. See Zarin, supra note 64, at 112. However, if
the foreign business has listed itself on a U.S. stock exchange or has operations inside the United
States, it will not escape FCPA coverage. See id. Some London-based banks are reportedly
attempting to attract clients away from New York by claiming that relocating to the United
Kingdom will reduce exposure to American laws banning bribery and money laundering. If the
London-based bank or the foreign business itself have listed on the U.S. exchanges or have
operations inside the United States, this claim is not true. The United States asserts jurisdiction over
businesses listed on U.S. exchanges or with operations inside the United States regardless of forum
shopping in placing bank business or incorporation. See id. at 112-13.
Although the United Kingdom has been scandalously lax in enforcing its own laws and
meeting its treaty obligations to combat bribery, this situation may be improving since Jessica de
Grazia, the chief of the Serious Fraud Unit in the Manhattan District Attorney's Office, was recently
named head of the U.K. Serious Fraud Office. The FCPA Blog, http://www.fcpablog.com/
blog/2009/7/24/here-comes-the-sfo-part-one.html (July 24, 2009, 08:22 EST). She has fired half the
staff in the U.K. office. See David Leppard, She Came, She Saw, She Scythed Through the SFO,
SUNDAY TIMES (UK), Feb. 1, 2009, at 4, available at http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/
business/economics/article5627453.ece. France (Elf-Aquitaine) and Germany (Siemens) have
aggressively prosecuted their own corporations for bribery abroad. See John Tagliabue, At a French
Trial, a Tale Unfolds of Graft on High, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2003, at A8; Posting of Cyndee
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It does not provide that a foreign sovereign can be named as a
defendant.79 It is not meddling in the internal affairs of a foreign nation.
This is not legal, moral, or cultural imperialism. 80 The United States is
asserting legal control over its own U.S. persons, such as James Giffen,
who is a U.S. citizen, an attorney admitted to the practice of law in the
State of New York, and a merchant banker whose bank is a New York
corporation.
The confusion arises because one element of an FCPA action is that
the payment or gift (alleged bribe) must be made to an official of a
foreign government. Although the foreign official him or herself is not,
and can never be, named as a party to an FCPA case, evidence of a
payment made to a foreign official by the U.S. actor must be presented. 8'
Thus, while the foreign official is not directly involved in an FCPA case,
his or her interest in preserving the secrecy of payments made by
Americans is involved. Tangential disclosure of the foreign official's
secrets is the real risk to foreign sovereigns in FCPA cases.
Not all payments or gifts made by Americans to foreign officials
are banned under U.S. law. There are two significant exceptions to the
FCPA. First, the U.S. statute banning bribery of foreign officials
provides a statutory exception for what are colloquially known as
"grease payments"-small routine facilitating payments (like a tip to a
waiter), which are customary in many countries with underpaid lowlevel government workers.8 2 This grease payment exception to FCPA
coverage is limited to payments to foreign officials performing routine,
Todgham Cherniak to Trade Lawyers Blog, http://tradelawyersblog.com/blog/archive/2008/
september/article/german-court-decision-in-one-of-many-siemens-corruption-of-foreign-pulbicofficials-cases/?tx ttnews[day]=21 &cHash=424b6fd49c (Sept. 21, 2008, 11:43 EST).
Japan has done nothing of significance against Japanese business interests; it has
sanctioned the notorious money launderers at Citibank Private Banking. On June 26, 2009 the
Japanese Financial Services Agency ordered Citibank to suspend all sales activities in Japan for one
month as punishment for slack money-laundering controls that allowed crime syndicates to open
hundreds of accounts. Citibank Division to Halt Salesfor Month, JAPAN TIMES, July 15, 2009, at 7;
Press Release, Citibank Japan Ltd., Citibank Japan Receives Administrative Action from the
Financial Services Agency (June 26, 2009), available at http://www.citigroup.jp/english/
press release/2009/20090626_en.pdf. This closure came after Citibank failed to rectify compliance
problems that resulted in the license revocation of Citibank Private Banking on September 30, 2004.
Mayumi Negishi, Citibank Japan Ordered to Close Four Offices over Legal Breaches, JAPAN
TIMES ONLINE, Sept. 18,2004, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20040918al.html.
78. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(g), 78dd-2(i), 78dd-3(f).
79. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a), 78dd-2(a), 78dd-3(a); see also In re GrandJury Subpoena 1,
218 F. Supp. 2d at 550.
80. See Spahn, supra note 3, at 172.
81. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a), 78dd-2(a), 78dd-3(a).
82. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(b), 78dd-2(b), 78dd-3(b); Andrea Dahms & Nicolas Mitchell,
Foreign CorruptPracticesAct, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 605, 617 (2007); Low, supra note 64, at 76.
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ministerial acts such as issuing a routine license or hooking up electrical
service. The grease payment exception is basically in accord with some
act of state doctrine cases which have found a ministerial exception for
routine, ministerial functions such as issuing a patent.84
James Giffen did not claim that the alleged $105 million payments
to the highest levels of the Kazakh government constituted a grease
payment exempted from FCPA coverage. The $105 million was
allegedly designed to influence high Kazakh officials to award oil
business to certain U.S.-listed oil corporations, which goes to the core of
the FCPA prohibitions.85
A second, more significant defense under the FCPA statute occurs
where the payments are legal under the written laws of the foreign
sovereign. The FCPA provides that "[i]t shall be an affirmative defense
to actions . .. that (1) the payment, gift, offer, or promise of anything of
value that was made, was lawful under the written laws and regulations
of the foreign official's, political party's, party official's, or candidate's
country."8 7
This exception is centrally important when considering act of state
doctrine defenses to bribery cases. Each sovereign jealously guards its
power to tax and regulate its own business actors. For one sovereign to
hand over the power to regulate what constitutes a legitimate business
expense to a foreign sovereign is an impressive demonstration of
international comity and respect for foreign sovereigns. Yet this is
precisely what the United States has done. The United States has given
away its own sovereign power to regulate payments made by U.S.
persons.
Any potential conflict between the laws of the two sovereigns
regarding whether the payment is an illegal bribe or a legal payment (a
gift, commission, tax, or fee) is statutorily resolved in favor of the
foreign sovereign by U.S. law. If the payments in question are legal
under the written law of the foreign country, the United States does not

83. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(b), 78dd-2(b), 78dd-3(b); Low, supra note 64, at 76.
84. See Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1293-94 (3d Cir. 1979);
Forbo-Giubiasco S.A. v. Congolcum Corp., 516 F. Supp 1210 , 1217 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Sage Int'l
Ltd. v. Cadillac Gage Co., 534 F. Supp. 896, 904 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
85. "Giffen does not argue that the $78 million was a 'facilitating' payment. Nor could the
alleged payments be characterized as 'facilitating' a routine governmental action because, as alleged
in the indictment, they were primarily intended to influence the senior Kazakh officials to award
new business to Mercator." Giffen 1, 326 F. Supp. 2d 497, 501 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (citing W.S.
Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400,409-10 (1990)).
86. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(c).
87. Id.
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attempt to regulate.8 8 Any concern regarding appropriate deference to
the legitimate sovereign interests of a foreign nation are exceptionally
well protected under the FCPA. This provision of the FCPA is truly
astonishing when examined in light of international comity and respect
for equal sovereignty between nations.
The FCPA statutory provisions provide considerably more
international comity protection to foreign sovereign interests than the
judge-made act of state doctrine. Under the FCPA, the payment must
merely be "lawful" under the law of the foreign sovereign, while under
the act of state doctrine the action must be "official."8 9 Proof that an
action is "lawful" under foreign law is a considerably lower threshold
than proof that it is an "official" act as defined by U.S. law.
To prevent disclosure of payments allegedly made by James Giffen
in U.S. judicial proceedings, the Republic of Kazakhstan merely needed
to pass a statute authorizing payments, commissions, or gifts by
foreigners to Kazakh officials in return for business contracts as part of
Kazakhstan's ancient, customary, and widely accepted alleged cultural
practices. 90 A simple legal rule codifying the allegedly widely accepted
practice of personal payments to officials in return for official business
would completely insulate Kazakh officials from having their U.S.
business partners face criminal prosecutions in the United States and the
collateral embarrassment of having Kazakh officials' personal financial
secrets made public.

88. See id. One business professor has argued that requiring a formal written statute by the
foreign state authorizing payments constitutes cultural imperialism by the United States. See Steven
R. Salbu, Battling Global Corruption in the New Millennium, 31 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 47, 68
(1999); Steven R. Salbu, Bribery in the Global Market: A CriticalAnalysis of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 229, 275-80 (1997); Steven R. Salbu, Colloquy,
ExtracurricularRestriction ofBribery: A PrematureEvocation ofthe Normative Global Village, 24
YALE J.INT'L L. 223, 227, 231 (1999); Steven R. Salbu, Information Technology in the War Against
InternationalBribery and Corruption: The Next Frontierof Institutional Reform, 38 HARV. J. ON
LEGis. 67, 84 (2001).
89. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(c); Giffen I, 326 F. Supp. at 501.
90. Philip Nichols of the Wharton School of Business at the University of Pennsylvania, the
leading business ethics scholar on bribery, has a very significant empirical study regarding whether
there is in fact a widespread cultural tolerance for bribery inside Kazakhstan. See generally Nichols,
supra note 11 (providing a detailed analysis of the study's findings and implications). Professor
Nichols's findings, that local people in Kazakhstan do not accept bribery as part of their customary
culture, provide relatively hard data evidence to counter Dean Salbu's policy arguments. See id. at
867; see also Spahn, supra note 3, at 203-08 (reiterating the empirical significance of Nichols's
study).
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C. The Act of State Doctrine in Bribery Cases
Having firmly established that a foreign official cannot become a
defendant in an FCPA action (the FSIA does not apply to FCPA cases),
and that if a payment is legal under the law of the foreign state, there is
no FCPA violation in the first place, we then come to the third legal
problem, the act of state doctrine. The act of state doctrine is a judgemade doctrine resting on both international comity and domestic
separation of powers policy underpinnings. 91 Act of state doctrine cases
historically have involved lawsuits in U.S. courts challenging a foreign
government's seizure, appropriation, or nationalization of private
property abroad, most famously the seizure of cigar companies' property
by Fidel Castro's government in the 1960s.92
The modern statement of the act of state doctrine is found in the
Supreme Court's 1990 case WS. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental
Tectonics.9 3 Kirkpatrick involved U.S. bribery 94 of Nigerian officials in
the context of a private lawsuit for damages under U.S. antitrust and
civil RICO laws against the winning bidder, Kirkpatrick, brought by the
disappointed competitor, Environmental Tectonics. (Note that the
91. See W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400, 404 (1990); Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964); Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S.
297, 303-04 (1918). Historically, the act of state doctrine was seen primarily as a function of
international comity policies. Kirkpatrick, 493 U.S. at 404; Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 423; Oetjen, 246
U.S. at 303-04. More recently the Court has emphasized the domestic U.S. separation of powers
underpinnings. Justice Scalia described this evolution as follows:
This Court's description of the jurisprudential foundation for the act of state doctrine has
undergone some evolution over the years. We once viewed the doctrine as an expression
of international law, resting upon "the highest considerations of international comity and
expediency." We have more recently described it, however, as a consequence of
domestic separation of powers, reflecting 'the strong sense of the Judicial Branch that its
engagement in the task of passing on the validity of foreign acts of state may hinder' the
conduct of foreign affairs.
Kirkpatrick, 493 U.S. at 404 (citations omitted).
92. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 685 (1976) (plurality
opinion).
93. 493U.S.at401.
94. The bribery at issue in Kirkpatrick was not "alleged" but proven in a prior criminal FCPA
proceeding. See Envtl. Tectonics v. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., 659 F. Supp. 1381, 1387 (D.N.J.
1987).
95. Kirkpatrick, 493 U.S. at 400-01. Private lawsuits launched by disappointed competitors
are clearly the most significant tool available to combat grand corruption at this point. An excellent
law review article, Ethan S. Burger & Mary S. Holland, Why the PrivateSector is Likely to Lead the
Next Stage in the Global Fight Against Corruption, 30 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 45, 47 (2006),
examines private lawsuits. The article notes that German law already provides for a private lawsuit
by disappointed competitors, id. at 69, that the United Nation's new Convention Against Corruption
has private lawsuit provisions, id. at 61, and outlines numerous U.S. civil cases, id at 63-68. Burger
and Holland provide a major contribution to the field.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2009

21

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 1 [2009], Art. 4

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

184

[Vol. 38:163

foreign sovereign, Nigeria, was not a party to Kirkpatrick, thus the FSIA
did not apply.) Writing for a unanimous Court rejecting the application
of an act of state doctrine shield, conservative intellectual powerhouse,
Justice Scalia, held:
In every case in which we have held the act of state doctrine
applicable, the relief sought or the defense interposed would have
required a court in the United States to declare invalid the official act
of a foreign sovereign performed within its own territory .... Act of
state issues only arise when a court must decide-that is, when the
outcome of the case turns upon-the effect of official action by a
foreign sovereign. When that question is not in the case, neither is the
act of state doctrine. 96
The elements of an act of state doctrine defense, then, require that
the act be "official" and "performed within the territory" of the foreign
sovereign.97 The third element of the act of state doctrine as articulated
by the Court in Kirkpatrick is met only where the outcome of the U.S.
proceeding requires the U.S. court to decide on the validity of an official
act performed within the territory of the foreign sovereign. Unlike the
Cuban cigar cases, where the validity of the new Cuban government's
seizure of formerly private property was at the center of the litigation,
resolution of the Kirkpatrick lawsuit did not require an American court
to invalidate any Nigerian contracts tainted by bribery. 99 The lawsuit in
Kirkpatrick sought money damages from the winning bribe-giving
bidder, Kirkpatrick, not re-opening the Nigerian bidding process for the
contract.100 Thus, the Court rejected application of the act of state
doctrine shield to the Kirkpatrick litigation.'0 o
The judge-made act of state doctrine differs from both the FSIA
and FCPA. Unlike the FSIA, the act of state doctrine may be raised in
cases where the foreign sovereign is not him or herself personally a

96. Kirkpatrick, 493 U.S. at 405-06.
97. Id. at 405. See GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION
IN UNITED STATES COURTS 762-63 (4th ed. 2007); RALPH G. STEINHARDT, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL
LITIGATION: CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE RISE OF INTERMESTIC LAW 507 (2002). Born,

however, describes the element as "public" rather than the Kirkpatrick language of "official."
98. Kirkpatrick,493 U.S. at 406.
99. See id.
100. Id. at 402.
101. Id. at 409-10. Rejecting act of state doctrine shields to private lawsuits is a significant
breakthrough in anti-corruption litigation, opening the door for private civil lawsuits. A plaintiffs
bar is developing. See Burger & Holland, supra note 95, at 72-73.
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defendant.10 2 In this respect, the act of state doctrine provides broader
shields than the FSIA. Unlike the FSIA, which protects virtually any acts
of a foreign sovereign wherever they may geographically occur,'0o the
act of state doctrine applies only to "official" acts which are performed
within the foreign sovereign's physical territory.'" In these two respects,
the act of state doctrine is significantly narrower than the FSIA.
Unlike the FCPA, which provides an absolute defense for any
payments which are "legal" under the law of the foreign sovereign, the
act of state doctrine requires that the act be "official."' 0 5 The act of state
doctrine also requires that the official act be made "within the physical
territory" of the foreign sovereign,10 6 unlike the FCPA which does not
limit "legal" acts to any particular geographical location.'o7 If Kazakh
statutes permit payments by foreigners to Kazakh officials via Swiss
banks, the FCPA respects Kazakh law. In both aspects, the FCPA
statutorily provides broader shields for foreign sovereign comity
interests than the judge-made act of state doctrine.
How much additional judicial respect, over and above the very
considerable international comity already provided in the FCPA statute
itself, should be given to the interest in preserving the secrets of a
foreign sovereign which may be tangentially exposed in a U.S.
prosecution of a U.S. person? This question could take us off into the
rarified world of theories of international comity.'0 8 Or, as in the

102. Compare supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text (stating that the FSIA is limited to
cases where a foreign official is named a defendant), with Kirkpatrick, 423 U.S. at 401, 409
(determining that the act of state doctrine is applicable when a foreign sovereign is not actually a
defendant).
103. See, e.g., Gang Chen v. China Cent. Television, 320 F. App'x 71, 73 (2d Cir. 2009)
(describing "the Filler factors" to aid in the determination of what constitutes an .'organ' of a
foreign state"); Belhas v. Ya'alon, 515 F.3d 1279, 1283 (D.C. Cir. 2008) ("But the FSIA is not
written so narrowly as to exclude all but foreign states in name. It applies to foreign states, their
political subdivisions, and their agencies and instrumentalities."); see also Daniel M. Singerman,
Comment, It's Still Good to Be King: An Argument for Maintainingthe Status Quo in ForeignHead
of State Immunity, 21 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 413, 451-52 (2007) (discussing case law that denied
applications for head of state immunity).
104. Kirkpatrick,493 U.S. at 406, 409.
105. Compare supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text (discussing the most significant
affirmative defenses under the FCPA), with Kirkpatrick, 493 U.S. at 406 (discussing the required
elements of the act of state doctrine).
106. Kirkpatrick, 493 U.S. at 409.
107. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(a) (2006).
108. See generally Joel R. Paul, The Transformation of International Comity, 71 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 19 (2008) (discussing the evolving theories of comity over four centuries-from
the Middle Ages through the early twenty-first century). John Cerone's take on international comity
is more skeptical, concluding that the United States "employ[s] international judicial authority when

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2009

23

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 1 [2009], Art. 4

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

186

[Vol. 38: 163

prosecution of James Giffen, it could take us down into the very
practical weeds of the act of state defenses to bribery cases.
Given how closely on point the Giffen fact pattern is to the Supreme
Court's unanimous 1990 decision in Kirkpatrick,'0 9 one might fairly ask
what possible defenses Giffen could have raised based on the act of state
doctrine after Kirkpatrickunanimously rejected use of the doctrine in the
context of Americans bribing Nigerians. Preserving the secrets of
Kazakh officials, the Swiss banks, and the U.S. oil companies allegedly
involved in bribing them provided an incentive for some clever legal
arguments on behalf of Giffen's defense.
V. THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE: THE 2002 CHIN OPINION
Giffen first raised the act of state doctrine as a defense to a
subpoena in the U.S. grand jury investigation. 110 The Republic of
Kazakhstan entered an appearance in the Giffen case through their
attorneys at Steptoe & Johnson, arguing that the documents held by
Giffen and Mercator were protected under Kazakh law and not subject to
U.S. discovery proceedings."' Giffen and Mercator applied three
separate times to the Kazakh Ministry of Justice for a "formal
clarification" regarding the discovery of records in the U.S. grand jury
proceeding.'1 2 Each request from Giffen through his attorneys at Akin
Gump suggested a basis under Kazakh law for protecting the documents
held by Giffen and Mercator." 3 Each time, Kazakh legal officials
(represented by Steptoe & Johnson) replied that the documents were
indeed protected from discovery in the United States based on Kazakh

law.114
it suits U.S. interests." John Cerone, Making Sense of the US. President'sIntervention in Medellin,
31 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 279, 284 (2008).
109. Comparesupra Part II, with Kirkpatrick, 493 U.S. at 400-04.
110. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena I, 218 F. Supp. 2d 544, 556 (2002). An introduction to the
act of state doctrine can be found in BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 97, at 751-806, and in
STEINHARDT, supra note 97, at 507-08.
111. In re Grand JurySubpoena 1, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 547, 550.
112. Id. at 548-49.
113. Id.
114. The first request from Giffen and Mercator to the Kazakh Ministry of Justice and
Supreme Court of Kazakhstan was in June, 2000. Id. at 548. Two of the highest legal officials of
Kazakhstan replied that .'[a]ny communication between [Kazakhstan] and [Giffen] ... is part of the
executive deliberative process of the executive power of [Kazakhstan]' . .. [and] is considered
'highly confidential and under the protection of executive privilege."' Id. (first alteration in
original). The second request followed in December, 2000, asking whether the documents in the
possession of Giffen and Mercator belong to the American corporation or to the government of
Kazakhstan under Kazakh law. Id. at 548-49. The Kazakh Minister of Justice promptly replied, in
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The act of state doctrine argument was that by questioning Kazakh
officials' interpretation of Kazakh law, the U.S. court was declaring
invalid an official act (the legal opinions regarding production of
documents under Kazakh law) within their territory." 5 The legal
opinions of the Kazakh Minister of Justice originated in Kazakhstan (at
least technically, although the basis for the Kazakh legal opinions were
suggested by Giffen's attorneys at Akin Gump, together with
Kazahkstan's attorneys at Steptoe & Johnson).'1 6 Giffen and Kazakhstan
argued the act of state doctrine prevented a U.S. court from questioning
the decision of the foreign sovereign made within the foreign
sovereign's territory, and therefore the documents were shielded from
subpoena discovery. 17
Judge Chin emphasized the actual effects of the Kazakh Minister of
Justice's legal opinions rather than the geographical location where they
were ostensibly created. "Although the 'acts' in question-the
Minister's Declaration, for instance-presumably originated in the
Republic [of Kazakhstan], they were prompted by and are now being
directed at a proceeding in the United States.""18 Judge Chin highlighted
both the intended and the actual effect of the Kazakh legal opinions:
Even if the acts at issue can be seen as originating in the Republic, the
intended effect is here in New York. That effect will be to deny the
grand jury access to records of an American corporation based in New
York. Thus, as a threshold matter, I conclude that the act of state
doctrine is not applicable. 119
Judge Chin's reasoning and holding on this first aspect of the act of
state doctrine closely follows prior U.S. act of state doctrine precedent as
20
articulated by the Supreme Court in Kirkpatrick.1
Judge Chin
characterized the doctrine as follows:

January, 2001, that the documents were 'protected by the sovereign rights of the Republic,' and
'not subject to transfer to any third parties' based on their status as commercial and official secrets.
Id. at 549 (quoting the Kazakh Minister of Justice). The third request from Giffen to Kazakhstan
occurred on April 12, 2002, asking whether any civil or criminal penalties could arise under Kazakh
law if the documents were released to the U.S. grand jury. Id. The Kazakh Minister of Justice
replied that criminal sanctions under Kazakh law for disclosure of state secrets may be punished by
incarceration for up to three years. Id.
115. Id at 556.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 549.
118. Id. at 556 (emphasis added).
119. Id.
120. Compare In re Grand Jury Subpoena I, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 551-52, with W.S. Kirkpatrick
& Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400, 406 (1990).
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The act of state doctrine counsels a court to avoid examining the
validity of an official act of a sovereign state taken on its own
soil... . [W]here the relief sought or the defense interposed would
require a federal court to declare invalid the foreign government's
official act[, t]he foreign government need not be party to the action;
the [act of state] doctrine may apply if the validity of the acts of a
foreign sovereign will be passed on by the court.121
Noting that the judge-made act of state doctrine is not
constitutionally mandated and has been preempted by acts of
Congress,122 Judge Chin further observed that the "doctrine has been
described both as a principle of abstention and as a rule of decision."1 2 3
The major policy supporting the act of state doctrine is the courts' efforts
to avoid adjudication of foreign sovereigns' official acts within their
own territory which might embarrass the United States in the conduct of
our foreign policy.1 24
Applying this formulation of the act of state doctrine to the
government's subpoena of documents in the possession of Giffen and
Mercator, Judge Chin held that the act of state doctrine did not apply.12 5
Judge Chin questioned whether the act of state doctrine was even
technically available under these facts. Relying on Kirkpatrick, Judge
Chin's reasoning was that the act of state doctrine only applies where
"the outcome of the case turns upon-the effect of official action by a
foreign sovereign."1 2 6 In the Giffen case, Judge Chin reasoned, the
validity of any action taken by officials of Kazakhstan inside Kazakhstan
is not at issue. 12 7 Here, "[Kazakhstan] intervened in an American grand
jury proceeding targeting an American citizen and an American

121. In re GrandJury Subpoena 1, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 551-52 (citations and footnote omitted).
Judge Chin relied on Sabbatino in his analysis of the act of state doctrine: "The act of state doctrine
in its traditional formulation precludes the courts of this country from inquiring into the validity of
the public acts a recognized foreign sovereign power committed within its own territory." Id. at 551
(quoting Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 401 (1964)).
122. The Second Hickenlooper Amendment is an example of a congressional reaction to
Sabbatino that resulted in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1965. STEINHARDT, supra note 97, at 567.
The Second Hickenlooper Amendment says that "no court in the United States shall decline on the
ground of the federal act of state doctrine to make a determination on ... a claim of title or other
right to property." Id.
123. In re GrandJury Subpoena 1, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 551 n.1.
124. Id. at 551-52.
125. Id. at 556.
126. Id. (quoting W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400, 406 (1990)).
127. Id.
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corporation, seeking to prevent access to records in New York and in the
New York corporation's offices in [Kazakhstan]."l 28
Judge Chin's understated opinion highlights the irony of a foreign
government intruding into a U.S. judicial proceeding against a U.S.
citizen while simultaneously requesting deference, comity, and respect
from the United States. Protecting secrets cannot be accomplished by
simply having the foreign minister of justice proclaim that the
American's actions and documents are shielded by foreign law.
A. Comityfor a PotentiallyEmbarrassedForeign Sovereign?

Potential embarrassment of a foreign sovereign is also not
dispositive. Rejecting attempts to expand act of state shields to protect
secrets that might embarrass foreign officials in Kirkpatrick, the
Supreme Court unanimously held that:
Courts in the United States have the power, and ordinarily the
obligation, to decide cases and controversies properly presented to
them. The act of state doctrine does not establish an exception for
cases and controversies that may embarrassforeign governments, but

merely requires that, in the process of deciding, the acts of foreign
sovereigns taken within their own jurisdictions shall be deemed valid.
That doctrine has no application to the present case because the
validity of no foreign sovereign act is at issue. 129
Judge Chin's opinion in Giffen closely tracks binding Supreme
Court precedent in Kirkpatrick,rejecting the potential embarrassment of
a foreign sovereign as justification for invoking the act of state doctrine
barriers to American judicial proceedings:
[T]he expansive formulation of the act of state doctrine advocated by
the Corporation and the Republic-that the doctrine should be applied
when there is a risk of embarrassment-would make enforcement of
the FCPA practically impossible. By definition, violations of the FCPA
touch upon "official acts" of sovereign nations, and every
investigation of a suspected violation of the FCPA has the potential to
impugn the integrity of the officials of foreign sovereigns. Congress

determined to enact the FCPA despite this probability, and has more

128. Id.
129. Kirkpatrick,493 U.S. at 409-10 (emphasis added). Kirkpatrick disapproved of the Ninth
Circuit's earlier decision in Clayco that the act of state doctrine shields foreign sovereigns from the
embarrassment of inquiry into the foreign sovereign's motivation for a particular commercial
transaction. See Clayco Petroleum Corp. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 712 F.2d 404, 407-09 (9th
Cir. 1983).
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recently expanded its reach to accord with international agreements the
United States encouraged.130
Every FCPA bribery case by definition involves a payment to a
foreign official, as Judge Chin notes. 13 1 Thus, application of the act of
state doctrine to prevent potential embarrassment of a foreign sovereign
would emasculate the U.S. statute. Potentially or actually embarrassing a
foreign sovereign as a barrier to U.S. judicial proceedings rests
fundamentally on judge-made notions of international comity, a topic of
great interest to academics and theorists. Delving into the finer points of
the various theoretical approaches to international comity would
normally cause any red-blooded American prosecutor or judge to run
fleeing in the other direction.132 Indeed this defense strategy worked for
Mobil Oil, among others, prior to the Kirkpatrick decision.133
International comity has historically been one of the linchpin policies for
act of state doctrine cases.134
Avoiding potential embarrassment to a sovereign is, in fact, one
historic policy underpinning of the act of state doctrine. The confusion
instigated by defendants in Kirkpatrick and Giffen is that under modern
formulations, the sovereign to be protected from embarrassment is not
primarily the foreign sovereign. Multinational corporations, even oil
companies however powerful, are not legally recognized as

130. In re Grand Jury Subpoena 1, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 557 (emphasis added).
131. See id. at 550, 557.
132. For those inclined to delve, I highly recommend Professor Joel Paul's concise, elevenpage, elegant tour de force intellectual history of the evolution of notions of international comity.
See generally Paul, supra note 108.
133. See Clayco, 712 F.2d at 407, 409; Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 654 F. Supp. 1487, 1514-20
(S.D.N.Y. 1987).
134. In Underhill v. Hernandez, the Court stated:
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign
State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the
government of another done within its own territory. Redress of grievances by reason of
such acts must be obtained through the means open to be availed of by sovereign powers
as between themselves.
168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897). This principle of comity hails from England in the seventeenth-century
case Blad v. Bamfield, (1674) 36 Eng. Rep. 992, 992-93 (Ch.). For a history of the act of state
doctrine and international comity, see generally Michael Singer, The Act of State Doctrine of the
United Kingdom: An Analysis, with Comparisons to United States Practice, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 283
(1981), identifying differences between the past and present application of the act of state doctrine
in the United Kingdom and the United States, and Joseph W. Dellapenna, Deciphering the Act of
State Doctrine, 35 VILL. L. REv. 1 (1990), articulating the history and present scope of the act of
state doctrine.
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sovereigns.' 3 ' The sovereign to be protected from embarrassment is the
U.S. executive branch. The specific policy concern is to ensure that U.S.
judges do not inadvertently undermine the U.S. executive branch's
ability to conduct foreign relations.13 6
Relying again on Kirkpatrick,Judge Chin observed:
To the extent that the investigation, aided by the enforcement of this
subpoena, might embarrass the [U.S.] executive branch, or hinder its
conduct of foreign relations-presumably because it risks angeringan
ever more importantstrategic ally over mere allegations bribery-it is

not for this Court to prevent it. It is the [U.S.] executive's
"independence the act of state doctrine primarily protects."l 37
B. SeparationofPowers

The second major policy underlying the act of state doctrine is
domestic U.S. separation of powers, particularly the notion that courts
should not interfere with or undermine the U.S. executive branch's
ability to conduct foreign policy.' 38 Tracing the evolution of the
135. See Andrew D. Patterson, The Act of State Doctrine is Alive and Well: Why Critics of the
Doctrine are Wrong, 15 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y Ill, 134-38 (2008) (discussing oil
company corruption as well as human rights and torture cases).
136. Indeed Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Powell in earlier act of state cases described the
doctrine as a function of the political question doctrine under Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 997-98 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring); Alfred Dunhill of
London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 727-28 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting); First
Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 785-90 (1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
This has not been the prevailing view; however, it does highlight the jurisprudential concerns of
U.S. courts, which are to restrain the judicial branch from interfering with executive foreign policy
discretion. See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 97, at 764.
137. In re Grand Jury Subpoena 1, 218 F. Supp. 2d 544, 557 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (emphasis added)
(quoting Associated Container Transp. (Austl.) Ltd. v. United States, 705 F.2d 53, 61 (2d Cir.
1983)).
138. The unanimous Court in Kirkpatrickstated:
This Court's description of the jurisprudential foundation for the act of state doctrine has
undergone some evolution over the years. We once viewed the doctrine as an expression
of international law, resting upon "the highest considerations of international comity and
expediency." We have more recently described it, however, as a consequence of
domestic separation of powers, reflecting "the strong sense of the Judicial Branch that its
engagement in the task of passing on the validity of foreign acts of state may hinder" the
conduct of foreign affairs.
W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400,404 (1990) (citations omitted).
There is a cottage industry of academics debating whether the act of state doctrine is a
function of international comity, domestic U.S. conflicts of law or choice of law, or separation of
powers doctrine jurisprudences, and whether it is a rule of abstention or a rule of decision. See
BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 97, at 763-65. For federal prosecutors in FCPA actions, fortunately,
this debate is moot after Kirkpatrick. See Kirkpatrick,493 U.S. at 406.
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doctrine, Justice Scalia in Kirkpatrick noted that the Court once viewed
the act of state doctrine as an "expression of international law, resting
upon 'the highest considerations of international comity and
expediency."' 1 3 9 In modern times, however, the Court views the act of
state doctrine as a "consequence of domestic separation of powers" and
gives deference to the U.S. executive branch's exercise of its foreign
affairs powers. 140
The conflation of appropriate judicial deference to the U.S.
executive branch with deference to a foreign sovereign is a feature of the
defense strategy based on the act of state doctrine.141 Fortunately, the
Supreme Court in Kirkpatrick as well as Judge Chin in Giffen are not
buying it.
While Kirkpatrick and Gifen are similar in their Americansbribing-abroad fact patterns and in their rejection of act of state defenses,
there is one major difference between the two cases, which significantly
impacts the separation of powers policy aspect of the act of state
doctrine. The major difference between these two cases is that while
Kirkpatrick was a private, civil lawsuit brought by a disappointed
competitor,14 2 Gifen is a criminal prosecution brought by the U.S.
government itself.143 For act of state doctrine purposes, this distinction
between a private civil action and a criminal prosecution launched by the
federal government itself is significant.
Kirkpatrick rejects application of the act of state doctrine to shield
alleged bribe-givers in a private, civil action, rejecting the notion that
embarrassing a foreign sovereign would undermine the U.S. executive
branch's ability to conduct foreign affairs.'" Gifen, as a criminal
prosecution, has the U.S. executive branch through the DOJ, as the
moving party.145 Presumably any danger of undermining U.S. foreign
policy has already been considered inside the U.S. executive branch
before the DOJ launches a major lawsuit as Judge Chin recognized:
139. Kirkpatrick 493 U.S. at 404 (quoting Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 303-04
(1918)).
140. See id.
141. Exactly how much deference U.S. courts should appropriately give to the U.S. executive
branch is a hotly contested political and legal topic at this historical moment. See generally Derek
Jinks & Neil Kumar Katyal, DisregardingForeign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1230 (2007)
(arguing that broad judicial deference to the executive branch will lead to undesirable and
detrimental results). Fortunately, we do not need to reach that problem. But see infra note 147
(discussing the Bernstein letter exception to the act of state doctrine).
142. Kirkpatrick,493 U.S. at 402.
143. In re Grand Jury Subpoena 1,218 F. Supp. 2d 544, 547 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
144. Kirkpatrick,493 U.S. at 409-10.
145. See In re GrandJury Subpoena 1,218 F. Supp. 2d at 557.
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Here, the "major underpinning" that justifies invoking the doctrine is
absent, for separation of powers concerns are not implicated. The act
of state doctrine serves to caution a court to defer to the executive
branch when it appears its decision will "embarrass or hinder the
executive in the realm of foreign relations." This motion is brought by
the executive branch itself, and granting the Government's motion
merely ratifies the considered aims of the political branch. "The
conduct of foreign relations is committed largely to the Executive
Branch .... The doctrine of separation of powers prohibits the federal
courts from excursions into areas committed to the Executive Branch
46
or the Legislative Branch."
The act of state doctrine separation of powers underpinnings are not
as significant when the executive branch launches the lawsuit as they
might potentially be in a privately launched civil suit such as
47
Because the Supreme Court unanimously rejected the
Kirkpatrick.1
application of the act of state doctrine to protect non-party foreign
sovereigns from collateral embarrassment in a private suit, Judge Chin's
conclusion rejecting the act of state doctrine is even more firmly
grounded in the context of a criminal case.
C PoliticalExpediency
Lobbying the U.S. Department of State and other highly placed
officials within the U.S. executive branch to squelch the grand jury
investigation, Kazakhstan, through its attorneys at Steptoe & Johnson,

146. Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
147. The "Bernstein exception" involves the executive branch, which submits a letter to the
court stating it has no objection to the court exercising jurisdiction. See Bernstein v. N. V.
Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschappij, 210 F.2d 375, 375-76 (2d Cir. 1954).
Putting the executive branch on record prevents a court from inadvertently undermining executive
branch foreign policy. Submission of a Bernstein letter thus creates an exception to the act of state
doctrine. See id. The Supreme Court has not accepted the Bernstein exception, with Justice
Rehnquist embracing the exception in a plurality opinion for First National City Bank v. Banco
Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 768 (1972), and Justice Brennan writing that the Bernstein
exception would "require us to abdicate our judicial responsibility." Id. at 778.
A "Bernstein letter" was proffered in the Giffen prosecution after Kazakhstan objected to
their secrets being made public. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena 1, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 557. In
Kirkpatrick, the Supreme Court specifically declined to require or approve of the "Bernstein letter"
practice, raising as it does difficult issues regarding the independence of the judicial branch. See
Kirkpatrick, 493 U.S. at 404-05, 409. Where state or local prosecutors seek to enforce various
criminal laws against multinational corruption, the advisability of a "Bernstein letter" might be
considered to prevent dismissal on federalism or preemption grounds.
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took the position that their secrets should not be discovered as a matter
of political and economic expediency for the United States.148
To their credit, the U.S. executive branch seems to have rejected, 149
at least so far,15 0 this lobbying effort. Judge Chin noted:
In addition to these responses to the Corporation [Giffen and
Mercator], the Republic [Kazakhstan] made efforts to persuade the
United States Government to stop the investigation, including a

personal appeal from high officials of the Republic
States Department of State. The Corporation and the
sought, and were denied permission, to disclose the
motion papers in this case as part of an existing effort

to the United
Republic also
Government's
to lobby other

executive agencies to halt the investigation. These efforts have not
been successful. 51

Lobbying efforts were not successful in derailing the prosecution.
The fact that the U.S. political and economic interests in maintaining
good relationships with Kazakh officials controlling huge oil and gas
reserves did not undermine the criminal prosecution of U.S. actors for
alleged bribery in violation of U.S. criminal laws is significant from a
number of perspectives. The cynical view that our government is always
corrupt and partisan, and that the United States bases its policies on
economic expediency, particularly where oil is involved, is widespread
at home and abroad. 15 2 Another cynical view is that the idea of rule of
law is merely a window dressing for protecting the interests of elite
power players. 153
The Giffen case is a concrete example to counter these cynical
views of U.S. law. I do not mean to suggest that cynicism is always

148. See In re GrandJury Subpoena 1, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 547, 549. It has been proven that
Kazakhstan has vast untapped oil and gas reserves, which are estimated at about 30 billion barrels,
according to the IMF. Republic of Kazakhstan: Selected Issues, supra note 27, at 17. See the U.S.
Department of Energy's listing of various oil and gas fields and corporate interests in particular
Kazakh reserves at Energy Info. Admin., supra note 27.
149. The Giffen investigation was initiated during Bill Clinton's tenure after a referral from
Swiss banking authorities acting on a request from Belgian officials. See LEVINE, supra note 26, at
373-75. After George W. Bush became President in 2000, the Gifen investigation and prosecution
continued. The Giffen case is still open under the new administration of President Barack Obama.
150. Cf Letter from Senator Mark Pryor, State of Arkansas, to Attorney General Michael
Mukasey, supra note 55 (urging former Attorney General Michael Mukasey to deny Rakhat Aliyev
prosecutorial immunity in exchange for his offer to testify in the Gifen investigation).
151. In re GrandJury Subpoena 1, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 549 (emphasis added).
152. Stodghill, supra note 25, at 1.
153. Cf JOHN F. MURPHY, THE UNITED STATES AND THE RULE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS 349 (2004).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol38/iss1/4

32

Spahn: Discovering Secrets: Act of State Defenses to Bribery Cases

2009]

ACT OFSTATE DEFENSES TO BRIBERY

195

misplaced when it comes to the operation of the U.S. legal system.1 54 I
merely suggest that there are significant counter-examples. To the best
of my current understanding, the frontline prosecutors in Giffen in 2002
were not undermined by the State Department or the White House even
though Kazakhstan's oil and gas reserves are very impressive. 5 5 Despite
the lobbying attempts by Kazakhstan and its oil company alleged bribesuppliers, I believe that the Giffen prosecution may in fact be a
significant example of the U.S. rule of law operating properly, without
political, economic, or national self interest or favoritism. Or as Judge
Chin more judiciously stated the point:
The Corporation [Giffen and Mercator] and the Republic
[Kazakhstan] have raised the issue of whether the "line prosecutor" in
this matter adequately represents the executive branch. The

154. See, e.g., Barbara Crutchfield George & Kathleen A. Lacey, Investigation of Halliburton
Co./TSKJ's Nigerian Business Practices: Model for Analysis of the Current Anti-Corruption
Environment on Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct Enforcement, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 503,
505-06 (2006). French magistrates referred Halliburton, a U.S. company, for participating in a
scheme of about $180 million in bribes to Nigerian officials. Id. at 505. Halliburton's bribery,
through its then-subsidiary Kellogg, Brown, and Root ("KBR"), began in 1994, during the period
when Dick Cheney, later Vice President of the United States, was CEO of Halliburton. Id at 505-06
& n. 18. KBR pled guilty to a five-count criminal indictment resulting in the second largest fine in
FCPA history, $402 million, just before the end of the Bush and Cheney administration. See
Halliburton Co., Litigation Release No. 20,897A, 95 SEC Docket 570 (Feb. 11, 2009), availableat
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2009/lr20897.htm; Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Kellogg
Brown & Root LLC Pleads Guilty to Foreign Bribery Charges and Agrees to Pay $402 Million
Criminal Fine (Feb. 11, 2009), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/pr/press-releases/
2009/02/02-11-09kellogg-guilty.pdf; The FCPA Blog, KBR and Halliburton Resolve Charges,
http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2009/2/12/kbr-and-halliburton-resolve-charges.html (Feb. 11, 2009,
19:08 EST). No prison terms were involved in the U.S. case. See Halliburton Co., Litigation Release
No. 20,897A, 95 SEC Docket 570, supra; Press Release, Dep't of Justice, supra; The FCPA Blog,
supra. To review the charges filed against Halliburton, see generally Complaint, SEC v. Halliburton
Co., No. 4:09-399 (S.D. Tex. Feb. I1, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/
complaints/2009/comp20897.pdf.
155. See supra notes 149-51 and accompanying text. It is possible that the Giffen prosecution
was designed to take out certain oil companies in order to clear the field in Kazakhstan for more
favored ones. Cynical conspiracy theorists might favor such an analysis; however, I have not one
shred of evidence whatsoever to support such a theory. We did look carefully for such a pattern to
the best of our ability in the publicly available records of which oil and gas companies were
involved in developing Kazakhstan's reserves. See generally Cowan, supra note 29 (discussing
various business decisions and subsequent criminal charges against Giffen).
The short answer is that pretty much every major company has a piece of the action there
already. Operating through consortiums, virtually every major oil and gas company are already
participating in the Kazakh reserves. See The FCPA Blog, Grynberg v. BP et al., supranote 44. See
the U.S. Department of Energy's listing of various oil and gas fields and corporate interests, in
particular Kazakh reserves, at Energy Info. Admin., supra note 27.
Favoritism to certain oil companies does not seem to be a factor. I think we are dealing
with a relatively pure application of "equal justice under law." I could be wrong about this.
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Government provided a letter from Michael Chertoff, Assistant
Attorney General in charge of the Criminal Division of the Department
of Justice. The letter reiterates that the positions taken by the
Government "represent the positions of the United States." That letter
also confirms that "the Department of State and other appropriate parts
of the Executive Branch have been aware of the nature of this
investigation for more than two years, both because the Department of
Justice consulted within the executive branch, and because the
Republic itself has contacted the State Department regarding the
investigation."
To the extent that the investigation, aided by the enforcement of
this subpoena, might embarrass the [U.S.] executive branch, or hinder
its conduct of foreign relations-presumably because it risks angering
an ever more important strategic ally over mere allegations of

bribery-it is not for this Court to prevent it. It is the [U.S.]
executive's "independence the act of state doctrine primarily
protects." 56
The request from the Republic of Kazakhstan for respect and
deference under international comity doctrines is contrasted with
Kazakhstan's lack of respect for the United States. The foreign
government intervened in a U.S. judicial proceeding against a U.S.
person. Not content with intervening in the legal proceeding, the foreign
government then attempted to subvert the prosecution by political
lobbying inside the U.S. government. Fortunately, U.S. political and
legal branches were not intimidated by this behavior. Sometimes the
U.S. system works.
VI. ACT OF STATE PART DEUX: THE 2004 PAULEY OPINION
James Giffen himself, however, did not give up on his act of state
defenses after the 2002 Chin opinion. By 2004, Giffen through his new
attorneys at Kronish, Lieb, Weiner & Hellman, had re-formulated the act
of state defense. 57 Instead of claiming that the acts of state were the
legal opinions issued by the Kazakh government asserting the
156. In re Grand Jury Subpoena 1, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 557 (emphasis added) (citations
omitted). Michael Chertoff later served on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit and
Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security. See Covington & Burling LLP, Michael
Chertoff, http://www.cov.com/mchertoff/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2010). He is now senior of counsel at
Covington & Burling, LLP. Id. The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Enforcement
Director was Stan Sporkin. See Stanley Sporkin Appointed Director of Division of Enforcement,
SEC NEWS DIG., Feb. 13, 1974, at 1, 1, available at http://www.sec.gov/news/digest/1974/
dig02l374.pdf.
157. See Giffen 1, 326 F. Supp. 2d 497,499, 501-03 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
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documents were not discoverable under Kazakh law, Giffen now
claimed that the acts of state were his entire business operations,
protected because of his personal status as an official of the Kazakh
government.158
The revised act of state argument was that as an official agent of the
Kazakh government, any acts Giffen performed constituted official
Kazakh acts of state. 159 To support this re-formulation of the act of state
doctrine's applicability, Giffen pointed to his appointment in 1995 as
counselor to the President of Kazakhstan among other titles and
appointments over the years.160 Thus, he argued, all of the actions
performed were in his capacity as an official agent of the Republic of
Kazakhstan.161 As a U.S. citizen, James Giffen could not claim to be an
official of a foreign sovereign under the FSIA, therefore his claim was
made under the act of state doctrine. 16 2
This new strategy represents an interesting shift in the business
practices of U.S. bribe-givers. In the past, Americans wishing to bribe
foreign officials have attempted to shelter their activities by using
foreign agents or subcontractors. Americans wishing to bribe Chinese
officials, for example, would simply hire a Taiwanese or Hong Kong
local agent, consultant, or sub-contractor, letting the locals actually
deliver the bribes to Chinese officials while maintaining plausible
deniability for the Americans.16 3
Amendments to the FCPA statute required by the OECD AntiBribery Convention, however, have largely closed these loopholes.'6
Hiring foreign local agents, subcontractors, and consultants, as well as
most joint-venture structures, no longer enable U.S. bribe-givers to put

158. See id at 502-03.
159. Id.
160. See id at 499-500; id. at 500 n.5 ("Giffen has submitted documents to show that the
Kazakh government appointed him to various official positions. These documents establish that
Giffen was appointed at various times as a representative, consultant or agent by different Kazakh
government officials." (citation omitted)).
161. Id. at 502.
162. See 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b) (2006).
163. See, e.g., Don Lee, Avery Dennison Case a Window on the Pitfalls U.S. Firms Face in
China, L.A. TtMEs, Jan, 12, 2009, at Al ("Faced with the choice between bribing officials and
losing business, some U.S. firms have turned to middlemen, often from Hong Kong or Taiwan, to
grease the wheels for them.").
164. See Donald Zarin, The Foreign Payments Provision, in FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES
ACT 2009, supra note 1, at 117-18.
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their heads into the sand and deliver the bribes while escaping criminal
culpability under the FCPA.16 1
The interesting new twist is that Giffen claimed shelter from
litigation by asserting his status as an appointed official of the Kazakh
government itself.166 Instead of hiring low-level, local foreign agents to
act as the intermediary, here the alleged bag man is a U.S. attorney and
banker, who is also a high-level, officially appointed agent of the
Kazakh government itself. Because this is a direct appointment to the
highest level of the Kazakh government, counselor to the President,
Giffen arguably placed himself above the reach of the FCPA.167
Although clever, this defense strategy was also unsuccessful. In
2004, Judge Pauley rejected the act of state doctrine defense based on
Giffen's status as an official agent as counselor to the President of
Kazakhstan. Like Judge Chin, Judge Pauley closely tracked the Supreme
Court opinion in Kirkpatrick.168 First, allegations of bribery, which
might impugn the motives of a foreign sovereign, do not create act of
state barriers to U.S. judicial proceedings under Kirkpatrick.16 9 Second,
the validity of any official act of Kazakhstan may not be second-guessed
by a U.S. court. Judge Pauley stated:
While the Supreme Court [in Kirkpatrick] agreed that the district court
would have to find facts that might impugn the Nigerian government's
motives, it concluded that the act of state doctrine did not bar suit
because the district court would not be required to rule on the legality
or validity of any public act of the Nigerian government.
Similarly, this Court concludes that factual findings in this case
might impugn the motives of the Kazakh government in its dealings
with Mercator. However, this Court will not need to rule on the
legality of any public acts of the Kazakh government. In essence,
Giffen's argument is that his de facto position within the Kazakh

165. See Jacqueline C. Wolff & Jessica A. Clarke, Liability Under the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, 40 REv. SEC. COMMODITIES REG. 13, 19-20 (2007); Department of Justice Issues
Opinion on U.S. Company Participation in Joint Ventures that Involve Foreign Government
Officials, FOREIGN CORRUPT PRAC. ACT UPDATES (Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering, Washington,
D.C.), Sept. 18, 2001, available at http://www.wilmerhale.com/files/Publication/7bc58de-73dl4847-8225-afl2blf9202flPresentation/PublicationAttachmentle6O883f8-6643-4215-943b-cbb4dd43
6cal/FCPAO91801.pdf. My thanks to Eryn K. Schornick for her excellent research on the subject of
joint venture liability under the FCPA.
166. Giffen1, 326 F. Supp. 2d at 503.
167. James Giffen, as a U.S. citizen, cannot claim immunity as a foreign sovereign under FSIA
despite his foreign titles. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1603(b), 1604 (2006).
168. See Giffen 1, 326 F. Supp. 2d at 501-03.
169. See id. at 501-02.
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government enabled him to pay the senior Kazakh officials-not that
his official duties required him to make secret payments.1 70
Judge Pauley rejected Giffen's claim that distributing personal
payments and gifts to Kazakh officials in return for oil contracts was
protected because he was the official agent of a foreign sovereign by
virtue of his appointment as counselor to the President of Kazakhstan.17 1
Judge Pauley correctly recognized that it is not the status or title of the
gatekeeper, intermediary, or bag man which potentially insulates the
payments from the FCPA.17 2 The central question for FCPA analysis is
whether the payment, gift, or bribe itself is legal under the written laws
of the foreign state.173
Whether a payment, gift, or bribe could constitute an "act of state,"
therefore, is the central legal issue.174 Judge Pauley's opinion carefully
analyzes each element of the act of state doctrine as applied to the
bribery prosecution of Giffen.'
A. Territorialityor Situs Element
Under U.S. law, the act of state doctrine applies only to official acts
performed within the territory of the foreign sovereign, as Justice Scalia
succinctly notes in Kirkpatrick,'76 which reaffirms the Supreme Court's
earlier position in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino.17 7 The act of
state doctrine is unlike the FSIA provision on this point, which covers
the actions of a foreign sovereign named as a defendant in a U.S. judicial
proceeding regardless of the geographical location where the act was
performed.17 8 The act of state doctrine, by contrast, applies to protect
foreign sovereigns' feelings (comity) in cases in which they are not
personally named as a party or a defendant. The act of state doctrine
170. Id. at 502-03 (citing W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400, 408
(1990)).
171. See id.at503.
172. See id.
173. See id.
174. See id.
175. See id. at 501-03.
176. See W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400, 406,409 (1990).
177. 376 U.S. 398, 401 (1964).
178. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1603, 1605 (2006); BoRN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 97, at 763 ("[T]here
are significant differences between the act of state and foreign sovereign immunity doctrines. First,
the act of state doctrine is limited to a foreign government's conduct that is consummated within its
own territory, while foreign sovereign immunity can extend to conduct anywhere in the world.");
see also STEINHARDT, supra note 97, at 507 ("Under the act of state doctrine, the courts of the
United States will not judge the validity of a foreign government's official acts within its own
territory.").
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applies where the U.S. judicial proceeding might tangentially embarrass
the foreign sovereign, but protects foreign delicate feelings more
narrowly than the FSIA by only protecting official acts performed within
the physical territory of the foreign sovereign.
The judge-made act of state doctrine appropriately operates more
narrowly than the statutory FSIA protections. The act of state doctrine
protects only official actions of a foreign sovereign that are performed
within its own territory. 179 There is no equivalent territorial or situs
element in the FSIA.180 Some commentators seeking to expand act of
state shields have questioned the continuing viability of the territorial
element of the act of state doctrine on the grounds that it is excessively
formalist and that it no longer applies in a globally integrated world. 8 1
The territorial element of the act of state doctrine is well grounded
in a long line of precedent dating back to its origins during the heyday of
legal formalism.18 2 The territorial element also significantly operates as a
limitation to the judge-made act of state doctrine in modern separation of
powers jurisprudence. It restrains the U.S. judiciary from excessive sua
sponte deference to foreign sovereigns at the expense of performing
judges' duty to apply U.S. law. As Justice Scalia observed in
Kirkpatrick, the duty of U.S. courts and judges is to apply U.S. law to
cases and controversies presented to them.183
Arguably, excessive sua sponte U.S. judicial deference to avoid
collaterally embarrassing foreign sovereigns not named as defendants
via the act of state doctrine does present the spectre of judges making ad
hoc American foreign policy decisions more appropriately vested in the
political branches. 184 Restraining judicial discretion to duck hard cases
179. BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 97, at 763; STEINHARDT, supra note 97, at 507.
180. BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 97, at 763.
181. See id. at 787-91; Ariel Oscar Diaz, The TerritorialityInquiry Under the Act of State
Doctrine: Continuing the Search for an Appropriate Application of Situs of Debt Rules in
InternationalDebt Disputes, 10 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 525, 536-37 (2004).
182. See, e.g., Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897) (recognizing the principle of
foreign sovereignty for "acts of the government of another done within its own territory").
183. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400, 409 (1990).
184. See Jack L. Goldsmith, The New Formalism in United States Foreign Relations Law, 70
U. COLO. L. REV. 1395, 1411-12 (1999).
[C]ourts applying the effects test rarely take the test seriously. They do not consult
pertinent foreign relations enactments or attempt to assess the content of pertinent U.S.
foreign policy. Rather, they usually make a simple intuitive judgment about the foreign
relations consequences of the adjudication. If the consequences seem sufficiently bad
from a usually unarticulated normative perspective, the courts abstain or preempt, again
usually without informed analysis of how such a decision actually affects U.S. foreign
relations.
Id. at 1414-15.
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involving embarrassed foreign sovereigns, the doctrine's situs element
limits lower courts' evasion of these tough statutory cases. Thus, Judge
Pauley's opinion appropriately stresses the significance of* the
territoriality element of the act of state doctrine, following the
Kirkpatrick and Sabbatino precedent as well as implementing the
underlying policy concerns of both international comity and domestic
constitutional separation of powers.
Judge Pauley did not duck, noting that the physical location of the
actions claimed as acts of state did not occur within the physical territory
of Kazakhstan:
The act of state doctrine also has a territorial dimension in that it is
limited to "acts done within their own States, in the exercise of
Governmental authority." Here, the illicit activities occurred in the
United States and Switzerland-not Kazakhstan. Moreover, Giffen
allegedly transferred funds from Swiss bank accounts to non-Kazakh
corporations. Because these transactions were dehors the geographic
boundaries of Kazakhstan and involved transactions among foreign
corporations, the act of state doctrine does not prohibit this Court from
ruling on their legality.185
Because the actions alleged, delivering and laundering the alleged
bribe money, occurred in the United States and in Switzerland, the
territoriality element of the act of state doctrine cannot be met, even
assuming arguendo that Giffen really was an official agent of the
Republic of Kazakhstan.
The territoriality element of the act of state doctrine operates
efficiently to mediate between appropriate U.S. judicial respect for
collateral embarrassment to delicate foreign sovereign feelings while
maintaining U.S. legal control over the actions of our own legal persons.
B. "Official" Acts Element
Not all actions performed within the territory of a foreign sovereign
are protected under the act of state doctrine. Only actions which are
"official" meet the elements of the act of state doctrine.' 86 A central
question, then, as Judge Pauley correctly reasoned, is whether the
Consider . .. the legitimacy of the horizontal abstention doctrines such as act of state and
political question. Here abstention masks the exercise of extraordinary judicial power,
for courts on which Congress has conferred jurisdiction are deciding which cases to
adjudicate on the basis of their own analyses of U.S. foreign relations.
Id. at 1421-22.
185. Giffen 1, 326 F. Supp. 2d 497, 503 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (citations omitted).
186. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
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payments made by Giffen constitute official acts.' 8 7 Can what American
law defines as a "bribe" be an "official act" in Kazakhstan? This
question could take us into the policy debates over claims of cultural
imperialism, into the stratosphere of competing international comity
jurisprudences and international conflicts of law,' 89 or right back down
to the elements of the U.S. statutory standards for determining when a
gift, commission, or customary payment becomes an illegal bribe under
U.S. law.
As Judge Pauley held, "[t]he FCPA countenances an affirmative
defense where the payments were 'lawful under9 0the written laws and
regulations of the foreign official's . . . country."'l

Despite the relative ease with which Kazakhstan produced opinions
from its legal ministry regarding the protection of documents under
Kazakh law in the 2002 litigation under Judge Chin, Kazakhstan was
unable to provide written Kazakh law authorizing a foreigner to make
personal payments for jewelry and jet skis to Kazakh officials in order to
obtain business contracts. 191 Empirical data from Kazakhstan indicates
that although corruption is widespread, the vast majority of Kazakh
people themselves do not approve of the practice of bribery; they view it
as a harmful practice and wish that it could be stopped. 192 Bribing
Kazakh officials was and is illegal under Article 312 of the Kazakh

criminal code. 193
But, Giffen does not assert that the challenged payments were lawful
under Kazakh law. Rather, he argues that his actions were effected
pursuant to the powers conferred by the Kazakh government. Because
Giffen claims to have acted as a Kazakh government representative, he
argues that his payments to senior Kazakh officials are shielded from
FCPA scrutiny. The letters of appointment that Giffen offers, however,
fail to show that his secret payments constituted official acts of
187.

Gifen 1, 326 F. Supp. 2d at 502-03.

188. See Spahn, supra note 3, at 168-79.
189. Joel Paul presents a wonderfully readable examination of international comity both as a
classical conflict-of-laws idea and a modern concept of comity as a justification for deference in a
wide range of cases. See generally Paul, supranote 108.
190. Gifen I, 326 F. Supp. 2d at 503 (alteration in original) (citing 15 U.S.C. §78dd-2(c)(1)
(2006)).
191. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena I, 218 F. Supp. 2d 544, 549 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
192. See Nichols, supra note 11, at 917-18, 923, 929.
193. CODE CRIMINAL art. 312 (Kaz.), translated in Criminal Code of the Republic of
Kazakhstan No. 167-1 dated 16 July 1997, http://unpanl.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/
APCITY/UNPANOI9168.pdf. Giving a bribe to a Kazakh official is punishable by up to five years
in prison. Id There is an exemption if the bribe-giver was extorted by the official. Id. Government
officials are prohibited from receiving bribes under Article 311. Id.
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Kazakhstan. Giffen's various official titles do not exempt his actions
from prosecution by the United States.194
Giffen did not claim that personal payments were authorized by
Kazakh law. Instead his act of state defense was based on his status as
the designated agent for the President of Kazakhstan. His argument was
that because of his status, everything, including secret personal
payments, became an official act of a foreign sovereign. 19 5 U.S. business
people abroad are often treated like kings. If you wanted to do business
in Kazakhstan, according to one Chevron executive, then you had to go
through President Nazarbaev's chosen gatekeeper, James Giffen.19 6
L'Etat c'est moi.19 7 Sadly for James Giffen, a U.S. citizen, our legal
system does not accommodate such delusions of grandeur.
The FSIA prohibits U.S. citizens from claiming immunities based
on alleged foreign sovereign official status.'98 As a U.S. citizen, Giffen
cannot claim immunity as a foreign official regardless of how many
foreign titles he possesses. If, on the other hand, James Giffen was, as he
now claims, an authorized agent of the U.S. government, he could not
also accept titles and emoluments from the Republic of Kazakhstan
without violating the U.S. Constitution unless the U.S. Congress
consented. The text of the U.S. Constitution itself prohibits U.S. officials
from accepting "without the Consent of the Congress ... any present,
Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King,
Prince, or foreign State."' 99
Giffen's payments were not "legal" (authorized under Kazakh law),
nor were they "official" acts under the act of state doctrine. 20 0 Although
the outer contours of what activities can be characterized as "official"
acts for act of state doctrine purposes remains contested, Judge Pauley's
opinion correctly held that U.S. payments to foreign officials that are not
legally authorized by the written law of the foreign sovereign cannot be
194. Giffen 1, 326 F. Supp. 2d at 503 (citations omitted). In order to determine that Giffen's
official titles did not exempt him from prosecution, Judge Pauley relied on United States v. Noriega,
746 F. Supp. 1506, 1521-22 (S.D. Fla. 1990), which held that the defendant's alleged acts, drug
trafficking and protection of money launderers, did not constitute public action for purposes of the
act of state defense merely because the defendant was the leader of his country.
195. Giffen 1, 326 F. Supp. 2d at 502.
196. Kazakhstan: Mobil, CIA Secrets May Come Out, CORP WATCH, Aug. 25, 2005,
http://www.corpwatch.orglarticle.php?id= 12586.
197. The French phrase for "I am the State," which is attributed to Louis XIV. E. COBHAM
BREWER, DICTIONARY OF PHRASE AND FABLE 630 (Cassell & Co. 1905) (1870). The French

Revolution followed.
198. See 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(3) (2006).
199. U.S. CONST. art. 1, §9, cl. 8.
200. Giffen I, 326 F. Supp. 2d 497, 503 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
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"official" acts, even when the intermediary has an official title from the
foreign government.20'
Judge Pauley's citation of United States v. Noriega2 02 is telling: just
as drug trafficking and money laundering cannot constitute official acts,
even when performed by the actual head of a foreign state, illegal bribes
and money laundering cannot constitute an official act when performed
by a "counselor" to the head of state.203 Judge Pauley's 2004 opinion
shuts the door on the new business strategy of insulating U.S. bribegivers by having them named as "officials" to the bribe-taking foreign
sovereign.
Judge Pauley's conclusion is also supported by Supreme Court
precedent regarding what is required for proof of an "official" act under
the act of state doctrine outside of the bribery context. The Supreme
Court rejected any expansion of the act of state doctrine in Alfred
Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, which held that absent a
"statute, decree, order or resolution of the Cuban government itself," no
act of state occurred.204 Mere statements by counsel for the interveners
during trial were not sufficient.205 Dunhill requires a "public 20[or
6
sovereign] act of those with authority to exercise sovereignpowers."
A "counselor" does not have authority to exercise sovereign
powers, of course. Generally, lower courts have followed the Supreme
Court's narrower definition of "official" acts as an element required for
act of state doctrine purposes.20 7 A small minority of lower courts have
ignored this element in non-bribery private civil cases, allowing the
doctrine to apply where the action is not "official" but merely condoned
by the foreign government.2 08 No lower court has permitted the act of

201. Id.
202. 746 F. Supp. 1506 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
203. Id. at 500, 503 (citing Noriega, 746 F. Supp. at 1521-22).
204. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 695 (1976).
205. See id. at 694-95.
206. Id (emphasis added); see also BORN & RUTLEDGE, supranote 97, at 772.
207. See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supranote 97, at 775. It is important to distinguish between preKirkpatrickand post-Kirkpatrick cases. Pre-Kirkpatrickcases stress the motive behind the act, while
post-Kirkpatrickcases do not take motive into consideration when determining the validity of the
act. See id at 776; see also Clayco Petroleum Corp. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp, 712 F.2d 404,
407 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that the act of state doctrine applies where inquiring into the
motivations of the foreign sovereign would result in embarrassment to the foreign nation). Clayco
was specifically rejected in Kirkpatrick. See W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., 493
U.S. 400, 403, 409-10 (1990).
208. See, e.g., Doe v. Qi, 349 F. Supp. 2d 1258, 1294-95 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (holding the act of
state doctrine applicable to unofficial acts supported by the government); see also BORN &
RUTLEDGE, supra note 97, at 773 (discussing lower court cases that adopted a more expansive
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state doctrine to shield an alleged U.S. bribe-giver based on his status as
an "official" of the foreign government since Judge Pauley's 2004
opinion.
C. A CommercialException?
While the FSIA statutorily creates an exception for foreign
sovereign activity that is primarily "commercial" in nature, 20 9 the judgemade act of state doctrine is not as settled. The Supreme Court has
addressed the issue only once, generating a splintered decision210 on this
controversial issue. 211 In Dunhill, the Court analyzed complex payments
of money allegedly owed as a result of Fidel Castro's Cuban government
expropriating cigar companies' formerly private property inside Cuba.212
One issue was whether statements by counsel for Cuba regarding the
nationalization of formerly private companies constituted an act of
state. 213 A majority of the Court rejected this notion. 214
The Dunhill majority did not, however, reach the issue of whether a
commercial exception to the act of state doctrine should be recognized.
A plurality of four (Justice White, joined by Chief Justice Burger and
Justices Powell and Rehnquist) did opine that a commercial exception to
the act of state doctrine is well founded.215 Agreeing with the position of
definition of what constitutes an official act). A small minority of courts have applied the act of
state doctrine to unofficial acts. See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 97, at 773.
209. See Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 614-15 (1992).
210. In Dunhill, Justice White wrote for the majority and plurality. 425 U.S. at 684-715.
Justices Powell and Stevens filed concurring opinions. Id at 715. Justice Marshall's dissent was
joined by Justices Brennan, Stewart, and Blackmun. Id. at 715-37. The case was argued before the
Supreme Court twice-first in 1974 and later in 1976. Id. at 682.
211. Antonin Scalia, as amicus curiae urging reversal, argued for the United States. Id. at 684.
Solicitor General Bork, Assistant Attorney General Lee, Deputy Solicitor General Jones, and Bruno
A. Ristau were on the brief Id
212. See id. at 685.
213. Id. at 689-90 ("[W]e requested the parties to address certain questions, the first being
whether the statement by counsel for the Republic of Cuba that Dunhill's unjust-enrichment claim
would not be honored constituted an act of state. The case was argued twice in this Court. We have
now concluded that nothing in the record reveals an act of state with respect to interventors'
obligation to return monies mistakenly paid to them. Accordingly we reverse the judgment of the
Court of Appeals." (footnote omitted)).
214. Id at 694. ("We thus disagree with the Court of Appeals that the mere refusal of the
interventors to repay funds followed by a failure to prove that interventors 'were not acting within
the scope of their authority as agents of the Cuban government' satisfied respondents' burden of
establishing their act of state defense." (quoting Mendez v. Saks & Co., 485 F.2d 1355, 1371 (2d
Cir. 1973))).
215. Id. at 695 ("[W]e are nevertheless persuaded by the arguments of petitioner and by those
of the United States that the concept of an act of state should not be extended to include the
repudiation of a purely commercial obligation owed by a foreign sovereign or by one of its
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the DOJ through its amicus brief authored by then-attorney Antonin
Scalia,2 16 the Dunhill plurality stated that the major policy underlying the
act of state doctrine is domestic separation of powers deference to the
U.S. executive branch.217 Further, any notion of absolute foreign
sovereign immunity has been restricted to "official" acts of a public or
governmental character. 2 18 Actions taken by a foreign sovereign that are
"commercial" in nature do not fall within the scope of the act of state
doctrine under this view. 2 19 This position is in accord with the U.S.
federal statutory exemptions for commercial activity under the FSIA,
and in accord with the positions of other foreign sovereigns regarding
protections for commercial activities by nation states. 22 0 A spirited
dissent authored by Justice Marshall and joined by Justices Brennan,
Stewart, and Blackmun disagreed; 2 2 1 while concurring opinions by
Justices Powell and Stevens reserved their decisions on the commercial
exception issue.2 22 Since Dunhill, academic commentators have been
debating the proposed commercial exception to the act of state doctrine,
while lower courts struggle with its uncertainty.
commercial instrumentalities. Our cases have not yet gone so far, and we decline to expand their
reach to the extent necessary to affirm the Court of Appeals.").
216. Id. at 696-97 ("(T]he Department of State... declares that 'we do not believe that the
Dunhill case raises an act of state question because the case involves an act which is commercial,
and not public, in nature."' (footnote omitted)).
217. Id. at 697 ("The major underpinning of the act of state doctrine is the policy of foreclosing
court adjudications involving the legality of acts of foreign states on their own soil that might
embarrass the Executive Branch of our Government in the conduct of our foreign relations.").
218. Id. at 698 ("[T]he United States abandoned the absolute theory of sovereign immunity and
embraced the restrictive view under which immunity in our courts should be granted only with
respect to causes of action arising out of a foreign state's public or governmental actions and not
with respect to those arising out of its commercial or proprietary actions.").
219. Id. at 701-02 ("[T]he United States has adopted and adhered to the policy declining to
extend sovereign immunity to the commercial dealings of foreign governments."); see id. at 706.
220. See id. at 703-04 ("[S]ubjecting foreign governments to the rule of law in their
commercial dealings presents a much smaller risk of affronting their sovereignty than would an
attempt to pass on the legality of their governmental acts. In their commercial capacities, foreign
governments do not exercise powers peculiar to sovereigns. Instead, they exercise only those
powers that can also be exercised by private citizens." (footnote omitted)).
221. Justice Marshall rejected the restrictive version of the act of state doctrine. Id. at 725 ("In
concluding that the act of state doctrine should not apply to the purely commercial acts of sovereign
nations, Mr. Justice White relies heavily upon the widespread acceptance of the 'restrictive theory'
of sovereign immunity, which declines to extend immunity to foreign governments acting in a
'private,' or commercial, capacity. The restrictive theory of sovereign immunity has not been
adopted by this Court, but even if we assume that it is the law in this country, it does not follow that
there should be a commercial act exception to the act of state doctrine.").
222. Id. at 715 (Powell, J., concurring) ("Since the line between commercial and political acts
of a foreign state often will be difficult to delineate, I write to reaffirm my view that even in cases
deemed to involve purely political acts, it is the duty of the judiciary to decide for itself whether
deference to the political branches of Government requires abstention.").
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Fortunately, for the purposes of examining the application of act of
state defenses in bribery cases, we could avoid the Dunhill commercial
and
other
Dunhill
altogether.
Unlike
exception
mess
nationalization/appropriation traditional act of state cases, Gifen-type
bribery cases do not involve any conflict whatsoever between the actual
laws of two sovereigns. A foreign nationalization of assets, such as the
Cuban cigar companies in Dunhill, is viewed as "legal" and authorized
under the foreign law of the foreign regime.22 3 This brings foreign law
into potential conflict with U.S. laws protecting private property
rights.22 4
There is no old Cold War-style conflict between sovereigns'
competing laws in modem anti-bribery cases. If foreign law authorizes
the payment of the alleged bribe as a legal payment, the United States
adopts the foreign standard. There is no potential for conflict between
the laws of two sovereigns in a bribery case. Only where the foreign law
does not legalize payments to its officials does the U.S. anti-bribery law
even begin to come into play. U.S. anti-bribery law supports whichever
policy is chosen by the laws of the foreign government. There is no
conflict of laws potential, and therefore the policies underlying the act of
state doctrine do not come into play.
We could therefore avoid the sticky question of whether business
transactions involving personal payments to foreign sovereigns are
exempted from act of state shields under a commercial exception.
Instead of looking to the FSIA statute, which does create a commercial
exception as our closest analogy, we can look instead to the FCPA
statute at issue in the actual bribery case before the courts. The FCPA
statute prevents any potential international conflict of laws at the outset,
rather than waiting for subsequent resource-consuming litigation to
resolve exceptions or other gloss on judge-made international comity
shields such as the act of state doctrine. There is no need for additional
comity through the judge-made act of state doctrine in FCPA cases in
the first place, and therefore we do not need to add extra layers of gloss
such as the commercial exception to the act of state doctrine. A cleaner
analysis simply rejects application of the act of state doctrine to bribery
cases in the first instance.
223. See id at 703-04.
224. Justice Marshall refers to the SabbatinoCourt, which stated that few issues were as hotly
contested in international conflicts of law as the right of a nation to appropriate private property of
foreigners, particularly in 1976 prior to the fall of Soviet-style communism. See id. at 729-30
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423, 428
(1964)).
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This is, admittedly, a novel approach to act of state analysis. I do
not mean to quibble with Judge Pauley's more traditional analysis
closely following the Supreme Court's plurality lead in Dunhill.
Considering whether a transaction such as $105 million in personal
payments by a U.S. citizen to Kazakh officials in order to obtain
business falls under a commercial exception to act of state shields, and
relying on the Dunhill plurality, Judge Pauley held:
Further, some courts have determined that the act of state doctrine does
not reach "acts committed by foreign sovereigns in the course of their
purely commercial operations." The indictment alleges deposits of
monies into foreign banks, which were then used by Giffen to fund
offshore entities for the personal benefit of the senior Kazakh officials.
These actions were commercial-not governmental, and are not
225
immune under the act of state doctrine.
A number of lower courts have followed Judge Pauley's lead in the
2004 Giffen decision recognizing a general commercial exception to the
act of state doctrine.2 26 No lower court has allowed act of state doctrine
shields in a bribery case since the 2002 and 2004 Giffen opinions by
Judges Chin and Pauley.

VII. CONCLUSION
The lessons of Judges Chin and Pauley in these two landmark
opinions on issues of first impression in the Giffen prosecution, closely
tracking the Supreme Court decision in Kirkpatrick, are clear. The act of
state doctrine does not, and should not, act as a barrier to disclosing
secrets in bribery cases. Instead of looking to the FSIA statute as our
closest analogy for act of state defenses in bribery cases, we should look
instead to the FCPA statute at issue in the actual cases before the courts.
The FSIA can never apply to an FCPA action because the FCPA
statutorily prohibits the foreign sovereign from being named as a
defendant.22 7 The FSIA is not the appropriate analogy in FCPA cases.
The FCPA statute prevents any potential international conflict of
laws at the very outset by providing a statutory affirmative defense for
8
payments that are permitted under the law of the foreign nation.2 2 If the
225.
226.
798, and
227.
228.

Giffen 1, 326 F. Supp. 2d 497, 503 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (citations omitted).
For a discussion of these lower court decisions, see BoRN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 97, at
STEINHARDT, supra note 97, at 558-59.
See supranotes 78-79 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
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payment is legal under foreign law, the FCPA provides an absolute
affirmative defense. 2 29 The United States has handed over its own power
to regulate U.S. payments to the law of the foreign sovereign. There is
no possibility of any conflict of laws between the two sovereigns under
the FCPA.
Under the FCPA, the payment must merely be "legal" under the
laws or regulations of the foreign sovereign. Under the judge-made act
of state doctrine, the threshold of proof is significantly more difficult;
the action must be "official." 230 Furthermore, while the act of state
doctrine only protects official actions taken within the physical territory
of the foreign sovereign, the FCPA protects any legal payment under the
law of the foreign sovereign, even if the payments are made outside of
the territory.23 1 On both elements, the FCPA statutorily provides
significantly greater protection for the legitimate comity interests of a
foreign sovereign than the act of state doctrine.
Resource-consuming litigation to resolve gloss on judge-made
international comity shields is not needed where the FCPA already
statutorily provides an absolute affirmative defense protecting the
foreign nation's legitimate comity interests. Therefore, as Judges Chin
and Pauley correctly decided, the act of state doctrine should not apply
to bribery cases, civil or criminal.
Piercing the veils of secrecy goes to the very heart of the
substantive problem of grand corruption bribery. Public disclosure of the
names of individuals, gatekeeper lawyers, accountants, banks, and shell
corporations servicing bribe-suppliers is a powerful deterrent to the premeditated, organized criminal business practice of bribe-giving. Public
disclosure of the structure of the transactions and the amounts alleged to
have been given as bribes allows ordinary people a glimpse into the
secret world of major global business transactions. Discovery of the
names of the actual people involved allows the international human
rights strategy of name-and-shame to begin. The focus is not only on the
"foreign bad guys," but, more importantly, on their United States and
OECD First World corporate, legal, accounting, and banking service
suppliers-the supply side "gatekeepers."
It is very unlikely that the President of Kazakhstan originated this
complex First World alleged bribery and money laundering scheme
himself. Focusing on New York attorney and merchant banker James

229. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
230. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
231. See supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
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Giffen, acting as an intermediary to U.S.-listed multinational oil and gas
corporations, is difficult but significant public law enforcement.2 32
Responsible corporations are shut out when contracts are awarded
based on bribery. The costs of the alleged bribes skew U.S. taxes and
undermine investors' abilities to accurately assess corporate value. The
costs of the alleged bribes, plus tax deductible legal defense costs, are
folded into the price of gasoline and heating oil paid for by U.S.
consumers. Systemic grand corruption bribery exacerbates massive
global poverty. Kazakhstan, despite vast oil and gas reserves, has onethird of its population living on $4.30 a day or less (U.S. dollars).23 3
The fact that the DOJ does not appear to have been shackled despite
the best efforts of powerful U.S. political lobbyists and law firms should
not be worthy of a law review article under normal circumstances. Evenhanded application of legal rules to the mighty elites as well as the poor
and powerless is the linchpin idea of the rule of law in America; the DOJ
has historically been the proud bearer of this standard. The prosecution
of the Giffen case during one of the darkest periods in the history of the
DOJ stands as a testament to the fidelity and bravery of at least some of
our prosecutors. 2 34 The Giffen prosecution may in fact represent the best
232. The oil companies allegedly involved are Mobil Oil, Amoco, Philips, Texaco, BP, Statoil
and British Gas. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
233. World Bank, Dimensions of Poverty in Kazakhstan: Volume II: Profile of Living
Standards in Kazakhstan in 2002, at 8, Report No. 30294-KZ (Nov. 9, 2004),
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTKAZAKHSTAN/Resources/PovertyAssessment_-YVoll.pdf
[hereinafter Dimensions of Poverty in Kazakhstan]. The shocking fact is that by global poverty
standards, living on less than $4.30 a day is not considered all that poor. Id. at 7-8. According to an
August 2009 UNICEF report, Kazakhstan is
considered ... one of the most economically developed countries among the
Commonwealth of Independent States, with its gross domestic product (GDP) having
increased at an average annual rate of 9-10 per cent during 2000-2007. However, the
global financial crisis, which has reduced GDP by almost one third, is affecting the
social sector.
UNICEF,

UNIVERSAL

PERIODIC REVIEW -

HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL,

UNICEF INPUTS -

KAZAKHSTAN 1 (2009), availableat http://lib.ohchr.org(HRBodies/UPR/Documents/Session7/KZ/
UNICEFUPRKAZ_S07_2010_UnitedNationsChildrensFund.pdf. Nevertheless, the government
is currently maintaining social programs, especially those for children and families. Id. at 1-4. The
level of poverty, concentrated in rural areas, decreased to fifteen percent by 2002. Dimensions of
Poverty in Kazakhstan, supra, at 3.
234. During this period of history, Alberto Gonzales, through his positions at the Bush and
Cheney White House, and later as Attorney General, politicized the DOJ's hiring and firing
processes. See S.J. Res. 14, 110th Cong. (2007); Preserving ProsecutorialIndependence: Is the
Departmentof Justice Politicizingthe Hiring and Firingof U.S. Attorneys?: HearingsBefore the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 1l0th Cong. 5-6, 28-29, 134, 210 (2007); Bennett L. Gershman, Lecture,
The Most Dangerous Power of the Prosecutor,29 PACE L. REV. 1, 6-7 (2008); Bruce A. Green &
Fred C. Zacharias, "The U.S. Attorneys Scandal" and the Allocation of ProsecutorialPower, 69
OHIO ST. L.J. 187, 205-06 & nn.81-85 (2008). Gonzales fired nine prosecutors who insisted on
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of American values-the rule of law operating without favoritism or
economic cronyism. The United States is taking responsibility to
discipline a U.S. citizen alleged to have committed serious crimes. It
also may stand as an example of the respect by at least some in the
political and diplomatic sections of the U.S. executive branch for the
independence of the rule of law as a fundamental American value.235
Transparency is the key to combating corruption. Discovery of
secrets and hard, factual evidence is the key to transparency.
POST SCRIPT
236

As I write in the spring of 2010, the Giffen case remains open.
Having failed in his claim to be an official agent of the Republic of
Kazakhstan, James Giffen now claims he was authorized by U.S.
intelligence services, asserting public authority defenses to the alleged
bribery and money laundering scheme. U.S. intelligence services deny
that they authorized his alleged bribery and money laundering schemes.
U.S. law provides that James Giffen is presumed innocent until proven
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in an open and transparent trial before
a jury of his peers.
None of the U.S. oil companies for which Giffen allegedly served
as the intermediary, nor any of the four Swiss banks, nor the three U.S.
banks through which Giffen allegedly laundered the alleged bribe
money, have yet been publicly indicted.237

bringing cases that could be harmful to Republicans' electoral chances or who refused to bring weak
cases that would be used against Democrats. Editorial, Investigatinga Scandal, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1,
2008, at A28. A 392-page congressional report on the scandal showed, among other crudely partisan
decisions, that U.S. Attorney David Iglesias was fired for bringing cases on voter fraud and public
corruption that were harmful to local Republicans. Id
235.

See CHARLIE SAVAGE, TAKEOVER: THE RETURN OF THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY AND THE

SUBVERSION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 202, 208 (2007) (documenting the "assault" on the rule of
law led by then-U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney during the same historical period as the Giffen
prosecution).
236. See supranote 54.
237. Credit Agricole Indosuez is the only bank to be named in the court opinions thus far. See
supra note 30. The other banks named in the indictment are Chase Manhattan, Citibank, Bankers
Trust, Banque Bruxelles Lambert (Suisse), Pictet & Cie, and Credit Suisse. See supra note 40 and
accompanying text.
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